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LINKING THE QUESTIONS: JUDICIAL 
SUPREMACY AS A MATTER OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
TABATHA ABU EL-HAJ

 
ABSTRACT 
This Article explains that what has been missing from the debate 
between advocates of popular constitutionalism and defenders of judicial 
supremacy is any account of the practice of constitutional interpretation. 
Without a clear sense of what constitutional interpretation involves, one 
cannot assess the prevailing assumption that the Supreme Court is 
uniquely positioned to interpret the Constitution or explore an expertise-
based justification for its claim to finality. This Article, therefore, revisits 
the debate about judicial supremacy by starting, not with history or 
politics, but with constitutional interpretation itself.  
Having explored the conventions of argument that constitute the 
practice of constitutional interpretation, this Article concludes that the 
Supreme Court can claim expertise with respect to determining 
constitutional meaning, but that its expertise has limits. It proceeds to 
explore whether and how this insight might be translated into limits to 
judicial supremacy. Toward that end, this Article develops a framework 
for assessing when the work of constitutional interpretation should be 
shared between the Supreme Court, the other branches of government, 
and the public itself. Finally, it uses the Court‟s doctrine with respect to 
race-conscious legislative districting to illustrate how the proposed 
framework might work. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Two questions lie at the heart of constitutional theory: How do we 
determine what the Constitution means? And who should decide?
1
 This 
Article argues that these two questions are linked. The question of who 
should be given final authority to decide what the Constitution means 
critically depends on what is required to determine constitutional meaning. 
Normative limits to the Supreme Court‘s claim to a monopoly over 
constitutional meaning lie, if anywhere, in limits to its expertise with 
respect to constitutional interpretation, should they exist. 
Today, most people take it for granted that the Supreme Court is in the 
best position to interpret the Constitution and thus is entitled to do so for 
all of us. But that consensus has not always existed in the United States, 
and, in recent years, a number of prominent constitutional scholars have 
challenged us to reexamine this assumption.
2
 These scholars have 
reopened the debate about who should decide what the Constitution 
means. 
 
 
 1. Stephen M. Griffin, The Age of Marbury: Judicial Review in a Democracy of Rights, in 
ARGUING MARBURY V. MADISION 104, 105 (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005) (noting the centrality of these 
two questions to the field even as debates have raged as to which deserves primacy). 
 2. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004) (demonstrating that during the founding and for much of American history 
judicial supremacy was rejected); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE 
COURTS 33 (1999) (arguing that ―people acting outside the courts can ignore what the courts say about 
the Constitution, as long as they are pursuing reasonable interpretations of the thin Constitution‖) 
(emphasis added). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss6/3
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The popular constitutionalism literature has been as rigorous as it has 
been provocative.
3
 Yet, it has largely failed to generate a widespread shift 
in attitudes about judicial supremacy.
4
 For instance, neither President 
Obama nor his administration has asserted that the Executive (or 
Congress) is entitled to determine independently the First Amendment‘s 
constraints on corporate political spending, or that they will continue to 
refuse to enforce the Defense of Marriage Act (―DOMA‖) should the 
Court find it constitutional.
5
 In fact, these scholars tend to be disheartened 
about whether American citizens are likely to reassert ―their right . . . as 
republican citizens to say finally what the Constitution means.‖6  
In the legal academy, the popular constitutionalism literature has been 
much criticized, occasionally even disparaged.
7
 Many see nothing to fear 
 
 
 3. The literature on popular constitutionalism is discussed at length in Part I. For now, popular 
constitutionalism defines ―a space within which the people‖ (typically understood in their represented 
form) ―deliberate about the meaning of the Constitution and how its commitments guide and bind them 
in democratic self-government as well as their agents in governmental office.‖ James E. Fleming, 
Judicial Review Without Judicial Supremacy: Taking the Constitution Seriously Outside the Courts, 73 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1377, 1391 (2005). 
 4. This was recently made apparent in the public reaction to Newt Gingrich‘s overblown 
challenge to judicial supremacy. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Among Legal Ranks, Shrugs for Gingrich‟s 
Tough Talk, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2011, at A24 (―The American legal establishment is not sure what 
to make of Newt Gingrich‘s mounting attacks on the independence of the federal judiciary. Reactions 
vary from amusement to alarm. What is hard to find is approval.‖); see also Scott Brown, Gingrich Off 
Base on the Judiciary, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 4, 2012, available at http://articles.boston.com/2012-01-
04/opinion/30584432_1_judges-court-system-judiciary. 
 5. President Obama did cause controversy when he publicly criticized the Court‘s campaign 
finance decision, Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), which held that corporations are 
persons with First Amendment rights to express their views on political candidates. See Noah 
Feldman, Imagining a Liberal Court, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 27, 2010, at MM38, MM42. Obama‘s 
State of the Union address was likely informed by his familiarity with this scholarship through his ties 
to the law schools at Harvard and the University of Chicago. Cf. Jeffrey Toobin, Bench Press: Are 
Obama‟s Judges Really Liberals?, NEW YORKER 43, 47–48 (Sept. 21, 2009), available at http://www. 
newyorker.com/reporting/2009/09/21/090921fa_fact_toobin (tying President Obama‘s skepticism 
about relying on public interest litigation to effect social change to the turn toward democratic 
constitutionalism, with its belief that ―‗judges don‘t own the Constitution,‘‖ in progressive legal 
academic circles). The Department of Justice‘s changed stance on DOMA was arguably another 
gesture at independent constitutional interpretation. See Charlie Savage & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, In 
Turnabout, U.S. Says Marriage Act Blocks Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2011, at A1 (revealing 
that the Obama administration had outpaced the Court in concluding that discrimination based on 
sexual orientation was equivalent to discrimination based on race or gender and thus should be 
afforded the protection of strict scrutiny). 
 6. KRAMER, supra note 2, at 227. 
 7. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Book Note, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 1594, 1629 (2005) (reviewing LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: 
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004)) (arguing that judicial supremacy is 
preferable to popular constitutionalism because it preserves the rule of law); L. A. Powe, Jr., Book 
Note, Are “the People” Missing in Action (and Should Anyone Care)?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 855, 884, 888 
(2005) (reviewing LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004)) (arguing that while popular constitutionalism ―appears to be alive and 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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in judicial supremacy and firmly believe that the Court is better suited to 
the task of principled constitutional interpretation than any other branch of 
government.
8
 ―Isn‘t it likely that you and I will hate the public‘s view of 
the Constitution?,‖ they ask. 
What has been missing from the debate between advocates of popular 
constitutionalism and defenders of the Court is any account of the practice 
of constitutional interpretation. This absence is particularly glaring since it 
is relatively uncontroversial that the Court‘s expertise with respect to 
constitutional interpretation would justify giving it the final say as to 
constitutional meaning.
9
  
Without a clear sense of what constitutional interpretation involves, 
however, one cannot assess the prevailing assumption that the Court is 
uniquely positioned to interpret the Constitution or explore an expertise-
based justification for its claim to finality. This Article, therefore, revisits 
the debate about judicial supremacy by starting, not with history or 
politics, but with constitutional interpretation itself. The Article uses the 
work of Phillip Bobbitt to provide a thorough account of how 
constitutional meaning is derived in practice.
10
 Bobbitt has identified a set 
of conventions with respect to constitutional argument and illustrated how 
they confer legitimacy on interpretations of the Constitution within the 
legal field.
11
  
 
 
well,‖ it is neither attractive nor necessary so long as the Court remains the majoritarian institution it 
is); Dale Carpenter, Judicial Supremacy and Its Discontents, 20 CONST. COMMENT 405, 420–35 
(2003) (offering an array of criticisms of Michael Stoakes Paulsen‘s and Larry Kramer‘s critiques of 
judicial supremacy). 
 8. See, e.g., Powe, Jr., supra note 7, at 893 (asserting a preference for judicial supremacy 
because ―the Supreme Court has been reasonably good on the upside and nowhere near as bad on the 
downside‖ as compared to populist constitutionalist ―mass movements of the twentieth century‖). 
 9. See infra notes 69–76 and accompanying text. 
 10. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991). 
 11. For a useful exegesis of the concept of legitimacy, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and 
the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787 (2005). Legitimacy comes in three forms: legal, 
sociological, and moral. For the purposes of this Article, where the term is used, I will be referring to 
sociological legitimacy. Sociological legitimacy exists where ―the relevant public regards‖ a practice 
or argument as ―justified, appropriate, or otherwise deserving of support for reasons beyond fear of 
sanctions or mere hope for personal reward.‖ Id. at 1795. Political scientists and legal academics 
usually use sociological legitimacy as shorthand to refer to a particular instance of sociological 
legitimacy—the public‘s confidence in the Court as an institution, although the measure of confidence 
is disputed. See Or Bassok, The Sociological-Legitimacy Difficulty, 26 J.L. & POL. 243 (2011) 
(reviewing the literature and explaining that sociological legitimacy ―is a concept that aims to describe 
[the] institutional capital‖ among members of the public or the public‘s ―institutional loyalty‖). The 
public, however, is not the appropriate ―relevant audience‖ when the question is the legitimacy of the 
Court‘s constitutional interpretations as constitutional interpretation. In such cases, the relevant 
audience is the legal profession. When I speak of sociological legitimacy, therefore, the relevant 
community is the legal profession. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss6/3
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A close analysis of the conventions of constitutional interpretation 
reveals that there are indeed limits to the Court‘s interpretive expertise. 
While the Court is generally more competent than other branches of 
government or the public in interpreting the Constitution, its 
―[i]nterpretive authority has internal limits.‖12  
The Court‘s claim to supremacy is strongest when its decisions are 
based on interpretive methods in which it is uniquely expert. These tend to 
be methods for which lawyers are specifically trained and the judicial 
forum is specifically well suited. By contrast, the Court‘s claim to 
supremacy is at its lowest ebb when its views are ultimately determined by 
methods for which it cannot claim unique expertise. 
Some constitutional questions, however, are ultimately resolvable only 
based on interpretive methods for which the Court cannot claim unique 
expertise. Moreover, some of these questions, for a variety of reasons, 
would be better resolved in conversation with other constitutional actors. 
They are issues with respect to which the other branches of government 
and the public itself are, at the very least, equally capable of undertaking 
constitutional interpretation.  
As such, there may be times when judicial supremacy should be 
abandoned and interpretive authority should be shared. This, of course, 
leaves us with an obvious question: Even if this is right, is it possible (let 
alone desirable) to translate this theoretical insight into practical limits on 
judicial authority over the Constitution? The Article suggests that it is. 
It proceeds to develop a framework that would enable one to decide 
when the default rule of supremacy should be revoked. The framework is 
designed to take into account two key points: first, the Court‘s relative 
expertise will vary in important respects depending on the question to be 
resolved; second, whether it is desirable to revoke the default rule will also 
turn on countervailing concerns, including an interest in settlement and in 
having a clear forum for decisionmaking.  
In the first instance, the framework seeks to address how one would 
decide whether the Court‘s claim to expertise is at its lowest ebb. Briefly, 
where the Court‘s interpretations do not ultimately turn on forms of 
interpretation for which it has special expertise, its views are less worthy 
of deference and more open to challenge.  
In light of the systemic advantages to granting a single institution the 
authority to resolve constitutional conflict, however, it would be foolish to 
 
 
 12. Alexander & Solum, supra note 7, at 1609 (noting the Court could not abolish the presidency 
on constitutional grounds).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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allow for shared interpretive authority every time the Court reached a 
conclusion that could not be attributed to its special competence. As such, 
the framework also offers an account of the kinds of considerations that 
should inform whether the default rule of supremacy should be revoked if 
the Court‘s claim to expertise is found to be at its lowest ebb.  
Revoking the default rule of judicial supremacy depends ultimately on 
a determination that the Court has failed to resolve constitutional 
ambiguity over time and that, all things considered, shared interpretive 
responsibility is preferable. All of this requires close analysis of a series of 
decisions wrestling with a specific constitutional question as well as 
careful consideration of contextual factors. 
The analysis offered here seeks to persuade the reader that it is possible 
to transfer issues out of the Court‘s exclusive domain.13 At the same time, 
it seeks to explain why we generally are right to accept the Court‘s views 
even when we disagree with them. That is, it offers an account of why 
judicial supremacy is appropriate in most cases—one that is grounded in 
the nature of constitutional interpretation itself. 
To be clear, the paradigm proposed here does not rob the Court of its 
constitutional say. Judicial review will remain, and the Court will continue 
to get the first shot at constitutional issues, so long as they can be properly 
presented. The framework does not allow challenges to judicial supremacy 
simply because one disagrees with particular outcomes, or advocate that 
one is permitted to ―simply ignor[e] or overrid[e]‖ the Constitution.14 
Merely disagreeing with the Court‘s interpretation is not a sufficient basis 
for revoking judicial supremacy because it would transform all 
constitutional law into constitutional politics—a line that while 
empirically difficult to draw is central to the internal account of the legal 
profession.
15
 
Because the analysis is context specific and depends on a close reading 
of specific decisions, this Article includes a case study. It is not unlikely 
that the Supreme Court will soon strike down two core provisions of the 
 
 
 13. Cf. Robin West, Ennobling Politics, in LAW AND DEMOCRACY IN THE EMPIRE OF FORCE 58, 
76 (H. Jefferson Powell & James Boyd White eds., 2009) (discussing the limits of the ―adjudicative 
constitution,‖ i.e., one entirely interpreted by courts). 
 14. Alexander & Solum, supra note 7, at 1602.  
 15. See Vicki C. Jackson, A Democracy of Rights: The Dark Side? A Comment on Stephen M. 
Griffin, in ARGUING MARBURY V. MADISON 147, 148 (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005) (noting that 
―[a]lthough it is surely harder to insist on the distinction between ‗judgment‘ and ‗will‘ in a post-realist 
world . . . . [M]ost judges continue to see this difference as essential to the legitimacy of their 
judgments‖). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss6/3
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Voting Rights Act.
16
 Were that to happen, the Court would effectively 
have put an end to efforts to give racial minorities a voice in legislatures 
through the creation of majority-minority legislative districts.
17
 The Article 
uses this highly contested interpretive question—whether the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits States from acknowledging race as they structure 
our democratic institutions—to flesh out how the analytic framework 
offered here could be used. 
Finally, this Article offers more speculative ideas about how revocation 
might be triggered and what a regime of shared interpretive authority 
would entail. Although it is beyond the scope of this project to defend 
popular constitutionalism as such, this Article seeks to show the problem 
is not that shared interpretive authority is unworkable.  
A normative framework that places limits on the Court‘s final say is 
preferable to a simple rule of judicial supremacy for several institutional 
reasons that compete with our desire for settlement. For one, a system that 
allows for principled opposition to the judiciary, in some circumstances, 
creates better checks and balances.
18
 Blind faith in judicial supremacy, as 
Thomas Jefferson recognized, ―make[s] the judiciary a despotic branch.‖19 
For another, the system of shared interpretive authority sketched here aims 
to facilitate broad engagement with the Constitution and constitutional 
reasoning, encouraging additional and more competent spaces for 
constitutional deliberation outside of the Court. Finally, by lessening the 
stakes in court-centered constitutionalism, it might even encourage the de-
politicization of the Court. 
 
 
 16. Cf. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2506 
(2009) (commenting that the original Voting Rights Act was justified by the ―‗exceptional conditions‘ 
prevailing in certain parts of the country‖ at the time but questioning whether given that ―we are now a 
very different Nation . . . conditions continue to justify such legislation‖). Two cases, which squarely 
raise the issue of unconstitutionality, are currently working their way toward the Supreme Court. See, 
e.g., LaRoque v. Holder, No. 10-0561, 2011 WL 6413850 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2011); Shelby Cnty., Ala. 
v. Holder, No. 10-0651, 2011 WL 4375001 (D.D.C. Sept. 21, 2011). 
 17. This result would be on constitutional grounds and arises out of the Court‘s jurisprudence 
with respect to considering race in the process of creating legislative districts. See infra notes 161–73 
and accompanying text. 
 18. Cf. Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010 SUP. CT. 
REV. 103, 145–47 (noting that the Court‘s current stature among both the public and elected officials 
significantly lessens whatever majoritarian checks on the Court may have existed in previous 
centuries).  
 19. Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Abigail Adams, Sept. 11, 1804, 8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 311 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1897) (―But the opinion which gives to the judges 
the right to decide what laws are constitutional, and what are not, not only for themselves in their own 
sphere of action, but for the Legislature & Executive also, in their spheres, would make the judiciary a 
despotic branch.‖). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Part I reviews the popular constitutionalism debate, arguing that what 
has been missing from this debate is a close examination of the practice of 
constitutional interpretation. Part II explains the significance of this gap 
and proceeds to give an account of what is involved in constitutional 
interpretation. Part III contains the central theoretical contribution of the 
paper, arguing that the analysis of the practice of constitutional 
interpretation enables us to see that there are limits to the Court‘s alleged 
expertise. Part III then develops a framework for analyzing whether the 
Court‘s claim to expertise is at its lowest ebb and whether the default rule 
of supremacy should be revoked as well as addressing how the process of 
revocation might work. Part IV applies that framework to the Court‘s 
affirmative action jurisprudence—specifically the Court‘s views on race 
and democratic representation—to illustrate how the proposed framework 
might work. Finally, Part V argues that a framework such as the one 
offered here—a framework that involves a default rule of supremacy and 
an account of when that default rule should be revoked—goes a long way 
toward addressing the major concerns that have been raised about popular 
constitutionalism.  
I. JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE DEBATE 
It is considered axiomatic in most circles today that the Supreme 
Court‘s unique function in our government is to determine what the 
Constitution requires and that once it has made a determination, the matter 
is settled.
20
 This view, among constitutional theorists, is called judicial 
supremacy. As Keith H. Whittington explains, ―a model of judicial 
supremacy posits that the Court does not merely resolve particular 
disputes involving the litigants directly before it . . . it also authoritatively 
interprets constitutional meaning for the nation as a whole.‖21  
Judicial supremacy is conceptually distinguishable from judicial 
review. The latter entails only that courts are entitled to rule on the 
constitutionality of legislative and executive action when properly 
 
 
 20. See, e.g., William E. Forbath, Popular Constitutionalism in the Twentieth Century: 
Reflections on the Dark Side, the Progressive Constitutional Imagination, and the Enduring Role of 
Judicial Finality in Popular Understandings of Popular Self-Rule, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 967, 969 
(2006) (arguing that since the New Deal, conservatives and liberals alike have been ―believers in the 
indispensability of judicial finality‖). 
 21. Keith H. Whittington, The Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
POLITICS: ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTION MAKING, MAINTENANCE, AND CHANGE 261, 271 (Sotirios A. 
Barber & Robert P. George eds., 2001). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss6/3
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presented.
22
 The crucial difference between judicial supremacy and 
judicial review is that ―[f]or the judicial supremacist, other government 
officials are bound not only by the Court‟s disposition of a specific case 
but also by the Court‟s constitutional reasoning.‖23 Judicial review is what 
enables the Court to decide Citizens United whereas judicial supremacy is 
what limits Congress‘ potential responses to passing laws that the Court is 
likely to accept as constitutional, e.g., disclosure laws. 
Acceptance of judicial review does not necessarily entail acceptance of 
judicial supremacy, although contemporary lawyers often find it difficult 
to imagine how the distinction would manifest in practice.
24
 This is 
because mainstream constitutional theorists frequently import an element 
of supremacy into judicial review, no doubt a result of the fact that our 
understanding of judicial review has incorporated over time the concept of 
supremacy.
25
 Later, the Article will explore what a world of judicial 
review without supremacy might look like.
26
 
While the Supreme Court has forcefully asserted that the Constitution 
requires judicial supremacy,
27
 in recent years, a number of prominent 
scholars have argued that the Constitution is highly ambiguous in this 
regard. Nowhere in the text of the Constitution is the Court designated as 
 
 
 22. See Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Beyond the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 759 (1997) (clarifying that judicial review goes 
well beyond invalidating statutes and is instead ―the practice of invalidating (state and federal) statutes, 
rules, orders and official actions on direct constitutional grounds‖). 
 23. Whittington, supra note 21, at 271 (emphasis added); accord Barry Friedman, The History of 
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
333, 352 (1998) (explaining that the ―concept of judicial supremacy[], mean[s] that a Supreme Court 
interpretation binds parties beyond those to the instant case, including other state and national 
governmental actors‖). 
 24. In fact, authors often mistakenly write as if the choice were necessarily between judicial 
review and popular constitutionalism. See, e.g., Todd E. Pettys, Popular Constitutionalism and 
Relaxing the Dead Hand: Can the People Be Trusted?, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 313, 354 (2008) (arguing 
for a version of popular constitutionalism in which ―the ultimate authority to interpret the Constitution 
[would be] shifted from the courts to the political domain‖). 
 25. See Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 
87 (1998) (noting that ―[j]udicial review, like all of constitutional law, has itself been the subject of 
sedimentary evolution‖ and, in particular, that ―[j]udicial supremacy in interpretation has built up 
beneath us‖); accord Griffin, supra note 1, at 107–17 (recounting the evolution of our understanding 
of judicial review and the emergence of supremacy as a core feature of the concept). 
 26. Cf. Friedman & Smith, supra note 25, at 43 (arguing that while one cannot erase 
constitutional developments ―we can . . . construct . . . new . . . understanding atop old ones‖). 
 27. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 523–24 (1997) (asserting supremacy over 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and denying Congress independent authority to interpret it); 
Cooper v. Aaron, 531 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (declaring that ―the federal judiciary is supreme in the 
exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that [this] principle . . . [is] a permanent and 
indispensable feature of our constitutional system‖); accord Whittington, supra note 21, at 261 (noting 
Court‘s assertion of judicial supremacy in the mid-twentieth century). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the exclusive interpreter of the Constitution.
28
 Larry Alexander and 
Frederick Schauer have argued that the existence of a final interpreter of 
the Constitution ―is preconstitutional‖—a ―logical[] antecedent to the 
written constitution.‖29 Whatever the merits of Alexander and Schauer‘s 
argument that a written Constitution logically requires a final interpreter, it 
does not resolve the critical question of whether the Court should exercise 
that role. 
Scholars of popular constitutionalism have turned to history to show 
that judicial supremacy was not inevitable. The question, they explain, was 
contested for, at least, the first century of the nation‘s existence.30 When 
the practice of judicial review first emerged, it did not entail supremacy: 
―Courts exercising judicial review in the 1790s made no claims of special 
 
 
 28. In fact, the text of the Constitution does not even explicitly authorize judicial review. See 
James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. 
REV. 129, 130 (1893). Thayer explained:  
So far as the grounds for this remarkable power are found in the mere fact of a constitution 
being in writing, or in judges being sworn to support it, they are quite inadequate. Neither the 
written form nor the oath of the judges necessarily involves the right of reversing, displacing, 
or disregarding any action of the legislature or the executive which these departments are 
constitutionally authorized to take, or the determination of those departments that they are so 
authorized.  
Id. For an extensive discussion of judicial review during the Convention and ratification debates see 
KRAMER, supra note 2, at 73–92 (explaining that judicial review was not a topic of sustained 
discussion at the convention, that the delegates arrived with a wide variety of views, that they clearly 
anticipated judicial review of state laws, but that there was no similar endorsement of judicial review 
for federal legislation, and that political not structural safeguards dominated during the ratification 
debates). Nevertheless, the practice of judicial review was fairly settled by the late 1790s. See id. at 7, 
105, 114–27. That said, given the various silences and in the face of some early objections, the precise 
origins and timing of its acceptance remain the subject of much scholarly debate. Compare Mary 
Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 503, 511 (2006) (arguing that 
judicial review was a genealogical outgrowth of colonial judicial practices and as such was presumed 
by the founding generation), with Morton J. Horwitz, A Historiography of the People Themselves and 
Popular Constitutionalism, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 813, 821 (2006) (criticizing Kramer for being too 
quick to concede that judicial review was wellestablished prior to the Civil War given the infrequency 
with which it was exercised by the Supreme Court), with William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review 
Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 554–58 (2005) (demonstrating that judicial review by state 
courts was both more intense, at least with respect to statutes regulating juries and court procedures, 
and more commonly exercised than scholars have thought); see also Mary Sarah Bilder, Idea or 
Practice: A Brief Historiography of Judicial Review, 20 J. POL‘Y HIST. 6 (2008) (recounting 
competing nineteenth-century accounts of the origins of judicial review in America and explaining 
how this rich debate became obscured in the mid-twentieth century). 
 29. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 
110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1369 (1997). 
 30. See, e.g., Whittington, supra note 21, at 262 (noting that our constitutional tradition ―is 
littered with debates over judicial authority and constitutional meaning‖ and ―judicial authority has 
often been contested by important segments of the populace, from abolitionists to labor unions to 
segregationists‖); KRAMER, supra note 2, at 229, 234 (same). 
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or exclusive responsibility for interpreting the Constitution.‖31 Following 
James B. Thayer, they argue that even judicial review was limited—
applying only to situations where the constitutional violation was blatant.
32
 
These scholars acknowledge that arguments for judicial supremacy 
surfaced as early as the ratification debates and that key Federalists 
frequently espoused theories of judicial supremacy by the late 1790s, but 
they tend to interpret these Federalist views as outliers.
33
 The only widely 
accepted view, at the time, according to Larry D. Kramer, was the view 
that as a by-product of the Justices‘ oath of office and the Court‘s duty to 
decide cases within its jurisdiction, the Court might sometimes need to 
declare certain actions on the part of other governmental bodies 
unconstitutional, i.e., judicial review.
34
 
Nineteenth-century actors who denied judicial supremacy typically 
understood the people themselves as having the final say regarding the 
meaning of the Constitution.
35
 Kramer explains the perspective of that 
tradition:  
Both in its origins and for most of our history, American 
constitutionalism assigned ordinary citizens a central and pivotal 
role in implementing their Constitution. Final interpretive authority 
 
 
 31. KRAMER, supra note 2, at 98 (emphasis added); see also Griffin, supra note 1, at 113–15 
(arguing that judicial review, as practiced in the early years, little resembles the current practice 
because, among other things, it did not entail supremacy); accord William M. Meigs, The Relation of 
the Judiciary to the Constitution, 19 AM. L. REV. 175, 202 (1885) (recounting the origins of judicial 
review but explaining that the judiciary could not ―conclusively settle the meaning of the 
constitution‖). It is worth acknowledging, in all this, that it was not until the mid-twentieth century that 
litigants regularly turned to the courts for rulings that another branch of government was acting 
unconstitutionally. 
 32. See Thayer, supra note 28, at 144 (emphasizing that judicial review was only thought 
appropriate where the constitutional violation was blatant); accord Meigs, supra note 31, at 193–94 
(explaining that the early cases asserting judicial review went ―no further than to say that, as the 
judiciary was a co-ordinate department of government,‖ the judges must ―adhere to their oaths of 
office‖). 
 33. See KRAMER, supra note 2, at 104 (noting that early on ―[v]ery conservative Federalists . . . 
[began] to articulate a theory recognizable today as judicial supremacy‖); see also id. at 134, 147. 
 34. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing the doctrine of judicial 
review); see generally Michael W. McConnell, The Story of Marbury v. Madison: Making Defeat Look 
Like Victory, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 13 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004) (explaining the 
historical context of Marbury v. Madison and why the decision is not an argument for supremacy, 
despite Justice Marshall‘s personal belief in supremacy); accord KRAMER, supra note 2, at 99–100 
(discussing Justice James Wilson‘s view that courts engage in constitutional interpretation because 
judges must uphold the Constitution like other institutional actors). 
 35. KRAMER, supra note 2, at 107 (explaining that ―[i]n a world of popular constitutionalism, 
government officials are the regulated, not the regulators, and final interpretive authority rests with the 
people themselves‖) (emphasis in original). 
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rested with ―the people themselves,‖ and courts no less than elected 
representatives were subordinate to their judgments.
36
 
How the public would manifest its final say was debated and evolved 
over time. By the early nineteenth century, the departmental theory 
emerged as the dominant answer.
37
 From James Madison to Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt, a series of Presidents and prominent constitutional 
thinkers took the view that each department of government had been 
granted an independent responsibility to interpret the Constitution.
38
 The 
coordinate branches of government were, therefore, equally obliged to 
engage in independent constitutional analyses.
39
 If a co-equal department 
concluded that the Court‘s interpretation of the Constitution was wrong, it 
was ―not only their right, but their duty as well, to decline to follow the 
judiciary‘s opinion.‖40 Each branch would be a check against the potential 
tyranny of the others, and the public would ultimately adjudicate, 
including at the polls.
41
  
Whittington nicely summarizes the difference between judicial 
supremacy and departmentalism as follows:  
A departmentalist president may well agree with John Marshall that 
in conducting its own duties the Court is not obliged to follow a law 
that it believes to be unconstitutional. The departmentalist would 
simply claim a similar authority for the other branches, limiting the 
generative force of judicial pronouncements. The departmentalist 
does not deny the Court‘s authority to decide cases. But he does 
deny the Court‘s authority to articulate constitutional norms or to 
settle questions of constitutional meaning for everyone.
42
  
 
 
 36. Id. at 8. 
 37. Id. at 106–07. 
 38. See, e.g., Andrew Jackson, Veto Message, July 10, 1832, 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE 
PRESIDENTS 576 (James D. Richardson ed., 1896) (explaining departmental theory in context of his 
decision to veto the re-chartering of the Bank of the United States); Jefferson, supra note 19, at 311 
(explaining the departmental theory in the context of the controversy over the constitutionality of the 
Sedition Act); see also Meigs, supra note 31, at 192 (listing Presidents through 1885 that espoused the 
departmental theory). Whittington‘s work is particularly interesting in this regard as it seeks to explain 
the political circumstances likely to give rise to challenges to the Court‘s authority. Based on a review 
of American political history, he theorizes challenges to judicial supremacy depend on the political 
power of the executive. See Whittington, supra note 21, at passim (arguing judicial supremacy is 
―politically constructed‖ and theorizing a typology of American presidents and the incentives each has 
to challenge the Court‘s authority to interpret the Constitution). 
 39. See Whittington, supra note 21, at 271. 
 40. Meigs, supra note 31, at 202. 
 41. See KRAMER, supra note 2, at 110. 
 42. Whittington, supra note 21, at 272 (emphasis added). 
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As Andrew Jackson put it: ―The opinion of the judges has no more 
authority over Congress than the opinion of Congress has over the judges, 
and on that point the President is independent of both.‖43 Thus, Jefferson 
argued that the Executive could release anyone sentenced under the 
Sedition Act, not as a matter of clemency but as a constitutional matter.
44
 
If the departmental theory were accepted today, Congress would re-pass 
limits on corporate spending, though it might, to the degree it was 
persuaded by aspects of the Court‘s reasoning, clarify that its scope would 
not reach parties that made documentary movies or materials distributed 
through video-on-demand. 
In addition to the historical arguments, a number of scholars have 
offered normative critiques of our exclusive reliance on the Supreme Court 
for constitutional interpretation. Two of the most comprehensive critiques 
are those of Mark Tushnet and Jeremy Waldron.
45
  
In Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts, Tushnet argues that 
judicial review should be abandoned entirely and replaced with populist 
constitutionalism because ―courts actually have not done such a wonderful 
job‖ with constitutional interpretation such that they can say they are 
significantly better than legislatures would be.
46
 He proceeds to advocate 
for constitutional law which is ―oriented to realizing the principles of the 
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution‘s Preamble,‖ which 
helps us define ourselves as a nation, and which is not ―something in the 
hands of lawyers and judges.‖47 His call is for populist constitutionalism.  
Meanwhile, Waldron has argued that from a philosophical perspective, 
in a reasonably functioning democracy with a strong rights-based culture, 
ordinary legislative procedures are capable of resolving questions of 
constitutional rights; these procedures are also more democratically 
legitimate than courts as a mechanism for enforcing rights.
48
 To emphasize 
 
 
 43. Jackson, supra note 38, at 582. Jackson continued: ―The authority of the Supreme Court must 
not, therefore, be permitted to control the Congress or the Executive when acting in their legislative 
capacities, but to have only such influence as the force of their reasoning may deserve.‖ Id. 
 44. Jefferson, supra note 19, at 311 (―The judges, believing the [Sedition Act] constitutional, had 
a right to pass a sentence of fine and imprisonment; because that power was placed in their hands by 
the Constitution. But the Executive, believing the law to be unconstitutional, was bound to remit the 
execution of it; because the power has been confided to him by the Constitution.‖). 
 45. A third is the work of Michael Stokes Paulsen. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most 
Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994) (arguing that 
the President ―has co-equal interpretive authority‖ and is not bound by the legal view of the other 
branches of government when engaged in executing the law). 
 46. TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 129. 
 47. Id. at 181–82. 
 48. Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006). 
Waldron does not refute judicial review of executive action, especially low-level executive officers. Id. 
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that judicial supremacy is not necessary for the rule of law to prevail, both 
authors have pointed to comparative constitutional systems, in particular 
Great Britain‘s.49 
Prominent constitutional theorists have not been shy in their normative 
criticisms of the new popular constitutionalism literature.
50
 The details of 
Kramer‘s historical account have also come under significant fire. While 
Kramer suggests that the American public repeatedly chose 
departmentalism over judicial supremacy through the New Deal, others 
have argued that judicial supremacy was accepted much earlier.
51
  
Barry Friedman and Erin F. Delaney, in a recent article, have usefully 
intervened in the historical debate by emphasizing the distinction between 
―‗vertical‘ supremacy—the supremacy of the Supreme Court over state 
and local governments‖ and ―‗horizontal‘ supremacy—the binding effect 
of judicial pronouncements over the coordinate branches of the national 
government.‖52 They show that while vertical supremacy was firmly 
established by the time of Reconstruction, horizontal supremacy was not 
established until the late nineteenth century.
53
  
Despite dating the establishment of horizontal supremacy significantly 
earlier than Kramer, Friedman and Delaney‘s work essentially confirms 
Kramer‘s central historical claim: at the Founding, and for an extended 
period thereafter, judicial review did not entail judicial supremacy. The 
latter emerged incrementally and after much contest.
54
  
 
 
at 1353–54 n.20. Stephen Griffin similarly situates his argument against judicial supremacy in 
democratic theory. See Griffin, supra note 1, at 140 (arguing that our constitutional democracy has 
evolved into a ―democracy of rights‖ and that this justifies normative limits to judicial review, a 
concept that today is defined by judicial supremacy). 
 49. See TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 163; Waldron, supra note 48, at 1349–50. 
 50. See, e.g., Alexander & Solum, supra note 7, at 1594 (expressing adamant opposition to 
popular constitutionalism). The concerns of critics are explored in Part V.  
 51. Compare KRAMER, supra note 2, at 207–18 with Forbath, supra note 20, at 969–70, 984–85 
(arguing that judicial supremacy was well established by the early twentieth century and that FDR‘s 
attack on the Court was one of his least popular platforms). 
 52. Barry Friedman & Erin F. Delaney, Becoming Supreme: The Federal Foundation of Judicial 
Supremacy, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1137, 1188 (2011) (arguing that the dynamics of a federal system 
explain the rise of judicial supremacy). 
 53. Id. at 1157–58, 1164–65, 1169 (suggesting horizontal supremacy was firmly established by 
the 1920s). 
 54. Id. at 1149–50; accord Mary Sarah Bilder, Why We Have Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 
POCKET PART 215, 217 (2007). Bilder concludes that:  
[B]ecause judicial review grew out of prior practice rather than an idea or conception of 
separation of powers, it was easy for the Founders to accept the judiciary‘s power to 
invalidate legislation . . . without resolving the question of whether the judiciary was the 
ultimate interpreter of the Constitution. 
Id. See also Friedman, supra note 23, at 342–43, 358, 374–79 (noting ―that judicial supremacy was not 
widely accepted‖ during the Jeffersonian period and was quite limited through the Jacksonian period). 
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What has been glaringly absent on both sides of the debate is any 
account of the practice of constitutional interpretation itself. Alexander 
and Schauer‘s defense of judicial supremacy, for example, enumerates the 
benefits of settlement, ignoring entirely the nature of constitutional 
interpretation.
55
 Richard Fallon‘s case for judicial review, as a direct 
response to Waldron, accepts for purposes of argument Waldron‘s 
assumption ―that debates about constitutional rights at bottom are or ought 
to be debates about moral rights.‖56  
While other advocates of judicial supremacy have emphasized the 
advantages of the judicial forum, their assertions are typically divorced 
from any account of how constitutional meaning is derived in practice.
57
 
Instead, they have enumerated an abstract set of advantages possessed by 
the judiciary as an institution. It is the quality of the Court‘s 
decisionmaking process, as compared to the legislative or executive 
forums, for instance, that is said to justify the judicial monopoly over 
constitutional meaning. Alternatively, we are told that ―[j]udges probably 
are at least as good as non-Article III actors at interpreting legal texts, and 
quite likely better‖ because, among other things, the judicial forum 
facilitates ―reason-giving.‖58  
Such accounts of the relative merits of the judicial process are 
longstanding, as William Meigs‘ comments, from 1885, illustrate: 
Nor should it be forgotten that the opinions of the courts are, 
unquestionably, entitled to great respect as evidence of the truth; 
they decide cases of an important nature, only after the most 
elaborate argument and consultation. They give more consideration 
to the subject than the executive often can, or ever is likely to; and, 
though they are largely influenced, still they are less likely to be 
 
 
 55. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 29, at passim (discussing at length the value of settlement 
with little to no mention of the practice of constitutional interpretation). 
 56. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 121 HARV. L. REV. 
1693, 1696, 1698 (2008) (arguing that the best justification for judicial review is that both courts and 
legislatures should be given the opportunity to veto legislation that might compromise individual rights 
out of a concern to tip the scales in favor of individual rights). 
 57. For example, although Alexander and Solum emphasize the distinction between 
interpretation and lawmaking and note that interpretation has internal limits, they offer only implicit 
references to the nature of constitutional interpretation. See Alexander & Solum, supra note 7, at 1609, 
1619–21. 
 58. Kermit Roosevelt III, Judicial Supremacy, Judicial Activism: Cooper v. Aaron and Parents 
Involved, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1191, 1196 (2008).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1324 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:1309 
 
 
 
 
directed by the heats and violences of party strife, than is 
Congress.
59
 
Waldron has summarized the judicial supremacy position:  
[T]hree outcome-related advantages . . . [are] claimed for courts (a) 
that issues of rights are presented to courts in the context of specific 
cases; (b) that courts‘ approach to issues of rights is oriented to the 
text of a Bill of Rights; and (c) that reasoning and reason-giving 
play a prominent role in judicial deliberation.
60
 
None of these justifications for judicial supremacy explores the nature of 
constitutional interpretation itself. 
Advocates of shared interpretive authority have taken issue with each 
of these claims. Yet, they too gloss over the practice of constitutional 
interpretation.
61
 While Tushnet meticulously compares congressional 
processes to judicial processes in order to rehabilitate the institutional 
capacity of legislatures to engage in constitutional interpretation, he is 
virtually silent about how the Constitution is interpreted.
62
 Tushnet‘s 
silence is not terribly surprising given that his ―[p]opulist constitutional 
law‖ is meant to ―return[] constitutional law to the people, acting through 
politics.‖63 That is, it is intentionally structured to look nothing like what 
constitutional law and interpretation actually looks like as practiced.
64
  
Meanwhile, Waldron goes further, proclaiming the practice of 
constitutional interpretation a distraction from important conversations 
about moral rights: ―In the United States, what is called ‗reason-giving‘ is 
usually an attempt to connect the decision the court is facing with some 
antique piece of ill-thought-through eighteenth- or nineteenth-century 
prose.‖65  
 
 
 59. Meigs, supra note 31, at 202 (emphasis added). William M. Meigs was one of three 
nineteenth-century legal figures to recount the origins of judicial review. For more on Meigs, see 
Bilder 2008, supra note 28, at 10–11. 
 60. Waldron, supra note 48, at 1379. 
 61. This is also true of the work of Larry Kramer and Stephen Griffin. 
 62. See TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 54–70 (describing a set of procedural arguments against 
populist constitutional law which focus on the processes of courts and legislatures). 
 63. Id. at 186. 
 64. Id. at 185. Tushnet further states:  
As I have described it, populist constitutional law might seem pretty thin compared to the rich 
body of constitutional law inside the courts: No three-part tests, no balancing of interests, no 
distinctions between content-neutral and subject-matter-based regulations of free expression 
. . . . Just the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble. 
Id. 
 65. Waldron, supra note 48, at 1383. Waldron has been criticized for this position by many, 
including now Justice Elena Kagan. Id. at 1385 n.110. This comment was made in the context of 
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The ways in which we ―connect the decision‖ to be made with ―some 
antique piece of . . . eighteenth- or nineteenth-century prose,‖ however, is 
precisely the practice of constitutional interpretation.
66
 Only Michael 
Stoakes Paulsen addresses constitutional interpretation itself, albeit briefly. 
At the conclusion of his lengthy article, he spends three pages explaining 
that in order for an interpretation of the Constitution to be legitimate it 
―must be constrained by a legitimate interpretive method,‖ specifically, 
textualism, originalism, precedent, or inferences from constitutional 
structure.
67
 Based on this, he concludes that the independent interpretive 
authority of the Executive should also be constrained by these methods.
68
 
In sum, what has been glaringly absent in the contemporary debate about 
judicial supremacy is a thorough account of the practice of constitutional 
interpretation itself. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AS PRACTICE 
Without a thorough account of how constitutional meaning is derived 
in practice, one is unable to assess the prevailing assumption that the Court 
is uniquely positioned to interpret the Constitution. Assessing the 
comparative advantage of the judicial forum is frankly difficult without 
knowing what interpretation involves.  
This gap is particularly critical to the normative debate over judicial 
supremacy insofar as, implicitly at least, both sides agree that the Court‘s 
expertise with respect to constitutional interpretation would, or could, 
justify its having the final say over constitutional meaning. That is, it is not 
particularly controversial to assert that the judiciary ought to get the final 
say to the degree that it is well positioned to engage in constitutional 
interpretation.  
For advocates of judicial supremacy, ―the courts of justice are . . . the 
bulwarks of a limited Constitution.‖69 Moreover, the judiciary‘s unique 
competence with respect to legal interpretation is offered as a primary 
justification for judicial supremacy. These scholars invoke the work of 
 
 
Waldron‘s argument that ―legislators give reasons for their votes‖ and that legislative reasons are 
frequently more robust than judicial reasons. Id. at 1382. Waldron argues: ―There are things about 
legislatures that sometimes make them vulnerable to the sorts of pressures that rights are supposed to 
guard against; but there are also things about courts that make it difficult for them to grapple directly 
with the moral issues that rights-disagreements present.‖ Id. at 1376. To illustrate this point, he 
recounts the British parliamentary debate over legalizing abortion. Id. at 1384. 
 66. Id. at 1383. 
 67. Paulsen, supra note 45, at 340–42. 
 68. Id. 
 69. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 428 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898). 
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early Federalists, despite the fact that those authors were more equivocal 
than contemporary scholars tend to be. Thus, the starting point tends to be 
Alexander Hamilton‘s assertion:  
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of 
the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the 
judges as a fundamental law. It must therefore belong to them to 
ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act 
proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be 
an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has the 
superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred: in 
other words the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the 
intention of the people to the intention of their agents.
70
  
It, therefore, follows that ―[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is.‖71 
The starting point for popular constitutionalists, by contrast, is 
democracy: the Supreme Court‘s position as the exclusive and final 
interpreter of the Constitution can only emerge from the consent of the 
public. Consent, as it happens, is typically granted.
72
 The Supreme Court 
turns out to be the department ―in which questions of constitutionality, as 
well as of legality, generally find their ultimate discussion and operative 
decision.‖73 The public‘s consent to the Court having the final say must 
therefore be explained.  
 
 
 70. Id. at 427. Hamilton proceeded to argue that it would not be reasonable to assume that the 
―[l]egislative body are themselves the [final] Constitutional judges of their own powers‖ because it 
would ―enable the representatives of the people to substitute their will to that of their constituents.‖ Id. 
at 426–27. His concern, however, was primarily the agency problem that Congress cannot be trusted to 
priviledge the intentions of the people (the Constitution) over the intentions of their agents (the 
representatives). Hamilton, thus, followed this passage with the following:  
Nor does the conclusion by any means suppose a superiority of the judicial to the legislative 
power. It only supposes that the power of the people is superior to both; and that where the 
will of the legislature declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people 
declared in the constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than the 
former.  
Id. at 427 (emphasis added). 
 71. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.); see supra note 34 
(discussing the Marbury case as an assertion of judicial review rather than a claim to judicial 
supremacy). 
 72. See Whittington, supra note 21, at 262 (showing that as an empirical matter the Court 
generally has the final say and that throughout U.S. history ―powerful federal officials have usually 
acceded to the Court‘s‖ interpretations of the Constitution).  
 73. Letter from James Madison to Mr. _________ (1834), in LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF 
JAMES MADISON 349, 349–50 (1865) (emphasis added).  
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Departmentalists have long explained the public‘s consent to the 
Court‘s having the final say as arising out of the public‘s confidence in the 
Court‘s unique competence as an expositor of constitutional meaning. As 
James Madison explained in 1834:  
But notwithstanding this abstract view of the co-ordinate and 
independent right of the three departments to expound the 
Constitution, the Judicial department most familiarizes itself to the 
public attention as the expositor, by the order of its functions in 
relation to the other departments; and attracts most the public 
confidence by the composition of the tribunal.
74
 
Confidence in the Court derives, in particular, from ―the qualities‖ of the 
Justices and ―the gravity and deliberation of‖ their decisionmaking.75  
In sum, the idea that the judiciary should get the final say because it is 
well positioned to engage in constitutional interpretation is neither new 
nor controversial. Even popular constitutionalists accept that to the degree 
the Court is relatively more capable when it comes to interpreting the 
Constitution, its views warrant deference—or more precisely, that the 
public is both likely and rational to grant the Court the final say in such 
circumstances.
76
  
Any normative limits to the Supreme Court‘s claim to a monopoly over 
constitutional meaning would seem, therefore, to lie in limits to its relative 
competence with respect to constitutional interpretation.
77
 The insight here 
is analogous to that in administrative law where the division of labor 
between courts and administrative agencies turns on their relative 
 
 
 74. Id. at 349–50 (emphasis added). Madison was an intermittent skeptic of judicial supremacy. 
See KRAMER, supra note 2, at 187–88 (noting that Madison‘s adjustments to judicial supremacy were 
incremental; he first recognized the need for finality where conflicts arose between states and national 
governments). 
 75. Letter from James Madison, supra note 73, at 350. Contemporary judicial supremacists, such 
as Justice O‘Connor, basically agree: ―[t]he Court‘s power [lies] in its legitimacy, a product of 
substance and perception that shows itself in the people‘s acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to 
determine what the Nation‘s law means and to declare what it demands.‖ Planned Parenthood of Se. 
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) (O‘Connor, J.). 
 76. Cf. TUSHNET, supra note 2, at x (noting that ―[judicial interpretations may have added weight 
because they come from experts who have thought seriously about the interpretive questions over a 
long period‖); accord Paulsen, supra note 45, at 335 (arguing that the judiciary‘s unique competence 
with respect to legal interpretation suggests deference to its views would be appropriate even in a 
regime of shared interpretive authority). 
 77. Christopher L. Eisgruber, in his response to Professor Paulsen, recognizes this point, though 
again it is ―structural characteristics‖ of the judiciary not a grounded analysis of interpretive expertise 
that is discussed. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branch: A Response to Professor 
Paulsen, 83 GEO. L.J. 347, 353 (1994) (accepting that ―interpretive authority belongs to the branch 
that, by virtue of its structural characteristics, is best able to interpret the Constitution‖). 
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expertise.
78
 A core justification for ―Chevron deference‖ is the recognition 
that, in the face of ambiguity, courts should refrain from determining 
statutory meaning in situations where policy considerations will be 
critical.
79
 Agencies have greater expertise about the policy consequences 
of one statutory interpretation rather than another while the judiciary lacks 
special competence with respect to policy.
80
 
Ambiguity is a constitutive fact of constitutional law. It arises not only 
because language is imprecise and the future is hard to imagine, but also 
because the founding fathers were pragmatists who saw themselves as 
establishing a framework or blueprint for the project of self-governance.
81
 
Acknowledging ambiguity is particularly important since the desire to 
interpret the Constitution differently from the Court will only arise where 
there is genuine room for debate.  
The fact that ―it is not always clear what the Constitution means‖ 
entails neither that the Constitution is wholly indeterminate nor that it just 
means what particular people want it to mean.
82
 Simply put, if it did, it 
would not be law.
83
 The line between law and politics is certainly 
amorphous, but it is central to the practice of law and the internal 
 
 
 78. See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 143–44 (1938) (noting that ―the 
extent of judicial review‖ of agency action ―is being shaped . . . by reference to an appreciation of the 
qualities of expertness for decision that the administrative may possess‖); cf. Alexander & Solum, 
supra note 7, at 1633–34 (explaining that one of three relevant considerations in making the case for 
judicial supremacy is the ―distinction . . . between those questions that a court is more likely to answer 
correctly (‗judicial questions‘) and those questions that a majoritarian body is more likely to answer 
correctly (‗legislative questions‘)‖). 
 79. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron ties 
this expertise argument to congressional intent (or at least a statutory presumption of congressional 
intent). Id. at 865. Interestingly, the development of ―Chevron deference‖ was anticipated early in the 
New Deal. See LANDIS, supra note 78, at 144 (―The interesting problem as to the future of judicial 
review over administrative action is the extent to which judges will withdraw, not from reviewing 
findings of fact, but conclusions upon law.‖). 
 80. Paulsen makes a slightly different use of Chevron, arguing for executive restraint in the form 
of deference to the constitutional interpretations of co-equal branches of government by analogy. In 
doing so, he notes that Chevron stands, at least partially, for a desire to locate interpretive power with 
the body that possesses specialized expertise. Paulsen, supra note 45, at 334–36. 
 81. See THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 198 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898) (explaining the 
various sources of ambiguity, including the limitations of language, as well as the Founders‘ belief that 
―equivocal‖ language would ―be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and 
adjudications‖); see also Friedman & Smith, supra note 25, at 62–65 (arguing that constitutional 
meaning accrues over time like sediment through established practices, which include but are not 
limited to, the trends in judicial decisionmaking). 
 82. BOBBITT, supra note 10, at xiv. 
 83. See Friedman & Smith, supra note 25, at 78 (―Without the juxtaposition between present-day 
preferences and more enduring values, the idea of constitutionalism is meaningless. If there is no 
difference between present desires and these other values, then the very idea of constitutionalism 
collapses upon itself and we are left with nothing but popular preferences . . . .‖). 
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perspective of law; more importantly, judges must operate as if the line 
exists.
84
 In fact, much of the skepticism about the ability of nonjudicial 
actors to engage in constitutional interpretation arises precisely out of a 
shared sense that the Constitution is law and the unrobed are incapable of 
distinguishing law from politics.
85
 
Constitutional interpretation, therefore, is at bottom a practice wherein 
ambiguity is resolved through conventions of argument. These 
conventions create the line between law and politics. No one has described 
the conventions of the practice of constitutional interpretation better than 
Philip Bobbitt. 
In Constitutional Interpretation, Bobbitt seeks to explain how 
something becomes a valid constitutional interpretation since, as lawyers 
recognize, ―not just anything can count as an interpretation of the 
Constitution.‖86 That is, he seeks to explain what is required for an 
interpretation to have sociological legitimacy within the relevant 
interpretive community (i.e., lawyers).
87
  
His answer is that lawyers and judges share a praxis—deeply 
embedded professional norms, habits, and practices—in which ―some 
interpretations are better than others‖ because they ―correspond to the 
various legitimat[e] modalities‖ of constitutional interpretation.88 Six 
modalities of argument are at the core of the practice.
89
 These are:  
 historical (relying on the intentions of the framers and ratifiers 
of the Constitution);  
 textual (looking to the meaning of the words of the Constitution 
alone . . .);  
 
 
 84. See Jackson, supra note 15, at 147–48 (noting judges operate as if a ―distinction between 
‗judgment‘ and ‗will‘‖ exists because the ―difference [is] essential to the legitimacy of their 
judgments‖). 
 85. See, e.g., Pettys, supra note 24, at 343 (―[I]f the interpretive power were somehow placed in 
the popular domain, citizens would not distinguish between their interpretation of the Constitution‘s 
fundamental demands, on the one hand, and their raw political desires, on the other.‖). 
 86. Alexander & Solum, supra note 7, at 1609. 
 87. See Fallon, supra note 11, at 1806 (noting that sociological acceptance can confer validity on 
constitutional norms—enumerated or accrued). 
 88. BOBBITT, supra note 10, at xiv–xv (emphasis added); see also id. at 11–12. 
 89. Other legal scholars define the grounds of agreement in constitutional interpretation more 
narrowly. For instance, it would seem that Fallon believes that the only territory of agreement is 
precedent. Fallon, supra note 11, at 1793, 1821–23 (arguing that precedent-based decisionmaking is 
unanimously accepted by the Justices; even originalists accept that judicial precedents can legitimately 
ground further, future claims of legitimate judicial authority, including when the original decision was 
itself erroneously decided). This tendency, however, results from conflating normative and 
sociological legitimacy, illustrating further that all six modalities regularly appear together. 
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 structural (inferring rules from the relationships that the 
Constitution mandates among the structures it sets up);  
 doctrinal (applying rules generated by precedent);  
 ethical (deriving rules from those moral commitments of the 
American ethos that are reflected in the Constitution); and  
 prudential (seeking to balance the costs and benefits of a 
particular rule).
90
  
As a matter of practice, all of the modalities of argument Bobbitt identifies 
are regularly utilized and accepted forms of constitutional argument.
91
 In 
fact, each of the six modalities identified by Bobbitt is familiar to any 
American lawyer
92—surely an indication that ―the relevant public regards‖ 
these modalities of argument as legitimate as a sociological matter.
93
  
Looking carefully at each of these modalities, it will become apparent 
that the Court‘s claim to unique expertise with respect to each varies 
considerably. First, a few words of explanation about the modalities are 
required.  
The textual modality is easiest to understand. This modality seeks to 
use the language of the Constitution itself to answer questions as to its 
meaning. Although constitutional interpretation frequently begins with the 
text, textualist arguments are rarely able to resolve ambiguities fully.  
The other modalities are also means to resolve ambiguity. The 
historical modality, in its classic form, seeks to settle ambiguity by 
reference to the original meaning or understanding of the language or 
constitutional commitment.
94
 For an example, in Regents of the University 
of California v. Bakke (1978), Justice Marshall used the original history of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to explain why it did not prohibit affirmative 
action in education.
95
 As we will see in Part IV, the historical modality is 
 
 
 90. BOBBITT, supra note 10, at 12–13 (emphasis and formatting added); see also id. at 13–22 
(elaborating on these forms). 
 91. The close analysis of the Court‘s affirmative action cases in Part IV amply supports this 
proposition. 
 92. BOBBITT, supra note 10, at xiv (arguing that we must ―understand[] the forms of 
constitutional arguments as the way in which a constitutional proposition is true rather than the reason 
it is true‖) (emphasis in original).  
 93. Fallon, supra note 11, at 1795. 
 94. BOBBITT, supra note 10, at 12. 
 95. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 396–98 (1978) (Marshall, J., 
concurring). 
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often broader than the views ―of the framers and ratifiers of the 
Constitution.‖96 
Doctrinal arguments seek to settle meaning by reference to previously 
agreed settlement of ambiguity. The important point is that ―doctrinal 
arguments are not confined to arguments originating in caselaw; there are 
also precedents of other institutions, e.g., the practices of earlier 
Presidents.‖97  
Ethical arguments use shared cultural commitments to resolve 
ambiguity. The ―principal error,‖ Bobbitt warns, ―one can make regarding 
ethical argument is to . . . equate[] ethical argument, a constitutional form, 
with moral argument generally.‖98 Ethical arguments are not simply 
normative. Instead, they ―appeal to those elements of the American 
cultural ethos that are reflected in the Constitution . . . [e.g.,] the idea of 
limited government.‖99 For example, in explaining why Harvard‘s 
affirmative action program would likely be held constitutional whereas 
Davis‘ was not, Justice Powell made a classic ethical argument:  
[Davis‘] program will be viewed as inherently unfair by the public 
generally as well as by applicants for admission to state universities. 
Fairness in individual competition for opportunities, especially 
those provided by the State, is a widely cherished American ethic. 
Indeed, in a broader sense, an underlying assumption of the rule of 
law is the worthiness of a system of justice based on fairness to the 
individual.
100
 
Finally, in the prudential modality, ―[t]he legal rule . . . is derived from 
a calculus of costs and benefits‖ after the facts have been taken into 
account.
101
 In other words, prudential arguments are ones that resolve 
meaning by considering the consequences of one or another alternative 
and tend to be ―actuated by facts.‖102  
It is adherence to the six modalities that renders certain constitutional 
interpretations sociologically legitimate within the legal field.
103
 Arguing 
 
 
 96. Compare BOBBITT, supra note 10, at 12, with infra notes 212–13 and accompanying text.  
 97. Id. at 18; accord THE FEDERALIST No. 37, supra note 81, at 198 (suggesting ―equivocal‖ 
language would ―be liquidated and ascertained by . . . [political] discussions‖ as well as judicial 
decisions). 
 98. BOBBITT, supra note 10, at 20–21. 
 99. Id. at 20. 
 100. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319 n.53 (emphasis added). 
 101. BOBBITT, supra note 10, at 17. 
 102. Id. at 16. 
 103. Bobbitt‘s approach to constitutional interpretation arises out of a Wittgensteinian tradition 
insofar as it recognizes that ―law-statements‖ have validity not because they correspond to some truth 
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within the modalities creates a phenomenological experience in which law 
is experienced as distinct from politics: ―The moves within each of the 
modalities are not political[;] indeed . . . a move within a mode is not even 
legitimate if it cannot be rationalized on a non-political basis.‖104 
Advocates and judges rarely, if ever, depart from these modalities. 
Departure from these forms would open one up to charges of political 
activism.
105
 As Bobbitt explains: ―Outside these forms, a proposition about 
the U.S. Constitution can be a fact, or be elegant, or be amusing or even 
poetic, and although such assessments exist as legal statements in some 
possible legal world, they are not actualized in our legal world.‖106  
While legal theorists may believe that only certain of these methods are 
legitimate and may complain that others are thoroughly illegitimate, in 
practice, lawyers and judges, whatever their theoretical persuasions, make 
arguments of all forms. Moreover, the only way to turn a political question 
into a legal question is through these ritual forms of constitutional 
interpretation.
107
 Normative theories of constitutional interpretation, in 
seeking to elevate one modality above all others and to explain why it 
alone is legitimate, fail to describe the practice of constitutional 
interpretation—the ways that courts actually decide constitutional issues 
and lawyers write briefs for those courts.
108
  
III. LINKING JUDICIAL SUPREMACY TO CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 
With this account of the practice of constitutional interpretation, we are 
finally in a position to assess the Court‘s interpretive expertise and to 
 
 
in the world but because they sound reasonable to those within the language community (practitioners 
of constitutional interpretation). Cf. id. at xii–xiv, xvi. Thus, he explains a ―modality‖ as ―the way in 
which we characterize a form of expression as true,‖ id. at 11 while the ―constitutional modalit[y]‖ is 
―the way[] in which legal propositions are characterized as true from a constitutional point of view.‖ 
Id. at 12. Further, ―the legitimacy of judicial decisions [is] maintained by adherence to certain 
conventional methods of constitutional construction.‖ Id. at xix; see also id. at 12–13. 
 104. Id. at 41. 
 105. Id. at xiv–xv. In this regard, it is worth noting that both Brown v. Board of Education of 
Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), both of which were (and are) 
quite controversial, are remarkable for how little the constitutional interpretations offered conform to 
the modalities Bobbitt describes. Cf. Robert Post, Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 30 
REPRESENTATIONS 13, 30 (1990) (noting that the ethical modality of constitutional interpretation ―can 
be the platform for a special form of leadership (as in Brown), or . . . the cause of the most unhappy 
form of vulnerability (as in Roe v. Wade)‖). 
 106. BOBBITT, supra note 10, at 22 (emphasis added). 
 107. See id. at 41 (explaining that the ritual form of constitutional interpretation, with its modes of 
argument, is ―how political questions are transmuted into legal questions in the United States‖). 
 108. Cf. id. at 31–42. 
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explore its implications for judicial supremacy. The preceding account 
enables us to see that there are, in fact, limits to the Court‘s alleged 
expertise. The judiciary is uniquely situated only with respect to some of 
these modalities of constitutional argumentation. This Part explains this 
claim and uses it to develop a framework for analyzing when it would be 
reasonable for the public to revoke its consent to the Court‘s final 
interpretive authority and, thus, for the other branches of government to 
reassert shared responsibility for constitutional interpretation. Finally, this 
Part explores how the process of revocation might work as a practical 
matter. 
A. The Court‟s Claim to Interpretive Expertise 
The Court‘s claim to expertise is strongest when it is engaging in 
interpretive modalities for which lawyers are uniquely trained and the 
judicial forum is particularly well suited. As James M. Landis once noted 
regarding the division of legal labor between judges and administrators: 
―Our desire to have courts determine questions of law is related to a belief 
in their possession of expertness with regard to such questions.‖109 
Similarly, constitutional questions should be left to courts where they 
possess relative expertise with regard to constitutional interpretation. 
Where constitutional meaning is elaborated through textual, historical, 
structural, and doctrinal argument, the Court‘s claimed expertise is solid, 
and deference to its views makes sense. Arguments based on text, 
structure, and doctrine depend on close analyses of language or ideas 
within a limited universe of texts. More importantly, this universe of texts 
with its accompanying stories is precisely what is taught in law school. 
―[I]n the last analysis,‖ these are modalities ―that lawyers are equipped to 
decide.‖110  
The competence of judges with respect to the historical modality—
especially in its traditional, originalist form—is also credible. As others 
have argued before me, ―[t]he telling of history is an evidentiary 
exercise‖—one that ―requires judges to sift through competing evidence 
offered by litigants.‖111  
Moreover, the judicial forum—including brief writing and the work in 
judicial chambers—is particularly conducive to the sort of reading, 
 
 
 109. LANDIS, supra note 78, at 152 (emphasis in original). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Friedman & Smith, supra note 25, at 88. 
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writing, and research that is required by these four modalities.
112
 By 
contrast, the legislative forum is ill suited to such arguments, especially 
those requiring a careful analysis of precedent.
113
  
The Court‘s claim to interpretive expertise is at its lowest ebb when it 
resolves constitutional ambiguity through interpretive modalities for which 
lawyers are not uniquely trained.
114
 Specifically, where the Court‘s 
interpretations of the Constitution ultimately rest on prudential and ethical 
argument, it lacks a special claim to interpretive expertise.  
Nonjudicial actors are at least as good at making these sorts of 
arguments about the Constitution, if not better. To take each in turn, 
prudential arguments are essentially policy arguments. They are arguments 
about the consequences of competing constitutional rules, and they turn on 
empirical facts. Policy arguments are a regular feature of legislative 
hearings as well as official and private legislative debates. Similarly, the 
Executive, especially its administrative arm, has both expertise and 
experience in empirical, consequentialist reasoning as well as established 
procedures and forums in which these types of arguments are regularly 
made (e.g., notice and comment rulemaking).  
Democratically accountable bodies have another competitive advantage 
as places for debates about constitutional constraints to the degree that 
those debates turn on prudential considerations. This is because final 
decisions in policy matters frequently turn on value judgments. 
Heterogeneous, modern societies generally default to the democratic 
process to make such value judgments in recognition of the fact that moral 
consensus is frankly impossible.
115
 
 
 
 112. The Court‘s unique competence with respect to these modalities is only plausibly contested 
by the legal offices of the Executive, particularly the Office of Legal Counsel, which issues its own 
opinions on constitutional matters. See Office of Legal Counsel, Opinions by Date and Title, available 
at http://www.justice.gov/olc/memoranda-opinions.html (last visited May 21, 2012). However, even 
here the Court has the advantage of relative structural neutrality. 
 113. See TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 63–65 (using the Bork hearings to illustrate the incongruence 
of reasoning about precedent in the legislative forum). 
 114. One might have thought that the natural direction of the argument would be that the Court‘s 
constitutional interpretations are not worthy of deference when they fail to comport with these six 
modalities of constitutional interpretation. This, however, would be to transform the six modalities 
from a practice into a justification. If the argument had gone in this direction, it would have been a 
new variant of the argument that judges must apply a consistent interpretive rule (here a set of six 
interpretive approaches); otherwise, it is not possible to see them as doing anything other than 
advancing their personal preferences. Cf. BOBBITT, supra note 10, at 119; see also Post, supra note 
105, at 27 (arguing that it is a mistake to seek to ground constitutional authority outside the process of 
interpretation itself). 
 115. The democratic process must, however, be appropriately inclusive and procedurally fair. 
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Judges, by contrast, are not particularly well positioned to adjudicate 
policy debates, lacking both technical expertise and democratic 
accountability.
116
 Moreover, the adversarial system and the rules of 
evidence undermine the reliability and scope of empirical evidence that 
comes before the courts, and judges are generalists. 
Several of the Court‘s own doctrines acknowledge this, calling for 
deference to other branches when a question turns on the weighing of 
empirical evidence or policy consequences.
117
 These same doctrines 
recognize a democratic accountability rationale for deference. To the 
degree that policy questions frequently cannot be resolved entirely on 
objective scientific grounds and instead require value judgments, courts 
have recognized that these decisions are best left to democratically 
accountable actors. 
Make no mistake, the claim, here, is not that ―[j]udicial decisions 
inconsistent with the people‘s will should be resisted‖ simply because they 
are anti-majoritarian.
118
 Rather, the point is that since value judgments are 
typically left to the democratic process, and policy decisions always 
involve value judgments, our democratic institutions should have a voice 
in constitutional interpretation that turns on prudential reasoning, absent 
some countervailing concern. 
The capacity of nonjudicial actors with respect to the ethical modality 
is similarly robust. As we have seen, the ethical modality is not an 
assessment of morality. Instead, it seeks to resolve ambiguity by reading 
the Constitution in light of fundamental tenets of American culture.
119
  
Once again, democratically elected bodies have the advantage of 
accountability (and relatedly exposure) to a wide range of perspectives on 
our national commitments. This is essentially Mark Tushnet‘s point when 
he suggests that ―disagreements over the thin Constitution‘s meaning are 
best conducted by the people, in the ordinary venues for political 
 
 
 116. On the question of technical expertise, see, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 67 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring) (noting ―substantive review of mathematical and scientific 
evidence by technically illiterate judges is dangerously unreliable‖). 
 117. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (explaining deference to 
Congress in terms of both institutional competence and democratic accountability); Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (rationalizing deference to agencies in 
terms of both democratic accountability and expertise); see also Eisgruber, supra note 77, at 355–57 
(discussing other doctrines in which judicial deference is established in recognition of the unique 
competence of other branches).  
 118. Cf. Neal Devins, Tom Delay: Popular Constitutionalist?, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1055, 1055–
56 (2006). 
 119. See Post, supra note 105, at 26 (explaining a modality of constitutional interpretation which 
―engages in an ongoing process of national self-definition [and] appeals to the authority of the 
Constitution as, for lack of a better word, ethos‖). 
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discussion‖ (where the ―thin Constitution‖ refers to the Constitution‘s 
―fundamental guarantees of equality, freedom of expression and 
liberty.‖)120  
Judges, by contrast, are intentionally insulated from the democratic 
process by our Constitution through the grant of life-tenure.
121
 Moreover, 
judges, as a group, turn out to be highly unrepresentative of the American 
public.
122
 
Another underappreciated advantage that nonjudicial actors have with 
respect to the ethical modality is that they are not constrained by the legal 
profession‘s limited notion of what constitutes a relevant text from which 
to discern our nation‘s fundamental ethical commitments. Presidential 
speeches, the speeches of Frederick Douglass, Martin Luther King, 
Elizabeth Cady Stanton or advocates of the Seventeenth Amendment, even 
monuments on the National Mall, are all arguably relevant to 
understanding our nation‘s fundamental moral commitments and the ways 
they have changed. Such texts are, nevertheless, awkward bases for 
judicial decisionmaking within the conventions of legal practice.
123
  
None of this is to say that the Justices (or other judges) should be 
precluded from engaging in the ethical modality. Justices, over time, 
accrue vast knowledge of important legal texts that reveal our ethical 
commitments. As such, it is important to have their voice in any debate.  
At the same time, we should not preclude others from speaking simply 
because there are benefits to hearing the Court‘s views. This is especially 
so given that when the Court ―purport[s] to speak for the fundamental 
ethos of the contemporary community,‖ it is likely to find itself in ―an 
 
 
 120. TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 14, 11. 
 121. See, e.g., Federalist No. 78, supra note 69, at 430. Hamilton famously stated:  
That inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the constitution, and of individuals, 
which we perceive to be indispensible in the courts of justice, can certainly not be expected 
from judges who hold their offices by temporary commission. Periodical appointments, 
however regulated . . . would . . . be fatal to their necessary independence. If the power of 
making them was committed either to the Executive or Legislature, there would be danger of 
improper complaisance to the branch which possessed it . . . if to the people . . . there would 
be too great a disposition to consult popularity . . . . 
Id. 
 122. See Fallon, supra note 56, at 1697 (noting that ―[v]irtually without exception, judges and 
Justices are well-educated members of the upper or upper-middle classes who have been socialized to 
accept professional norms‖); John Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining 
Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 369 (1999) (noting that judges ―are likely to bring to 
their work the perceptions of an upper middle class, educated, largely male, and largely white elite‖). 
 123. But see Friedman & Smith, supra note 25, at 75–76 (praising Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 
U.S. 702 (1997), for utilizing ―numerous sources of constitutional history, including statutes, state and 
federal court decisions, executive actions, activity by mobilized citizens, [and] professional task 
forces‖) (emphasis added). 
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exposed position‖ since its positions are ―justified in the end only by the 
wisdom of its own insight.‖124  
B. Theorizing Limits to Judicial Supremacy 
The Supreme Court‘s claim to supremacy is strongest when it is 
engaging in interpretive methods in which it is uniquely expert. When the 
Court‘s decisions turn on prudential or ethical judgments, however, its 
claim to expertise is at its lowest ebb. Interpretive questions that ultimately 
depend on the ethical and prudential modality are precisely the questions 
with respect to which the other branches of government and the public 
itself are, at the very least, equally capable of engaging. 
In order to imagine, how the limits of judicial expertise with respect to 
constitutional interpretation might inform a discussion of judicial 
supremacy, a number of considerations must first be explored. Most 
importantly, we must recognize the significant systemic advantages to 
granting a single institution the authority to resolve constitutional 
conflicts.  
The primary advantage of a bright-line rule of judicial supremacy is 
that it provides a clear forum for the ultimate resolution of controversies. 
The first advocates of judicial supremacy argued precisely this point. In 
the early 1830s, for instance, Justice Story urged that the Constitution 
required a single interpreter, whose interpretations would be final, in order 
to further the central benefits of all law: uniformity, certainty, 
predictability, and stability.
125
 This same argument was recently expanded 
upon by Alexander and Schauer, who warn against shared interpretive 
authority on the grounds that the ―settlement of contested issues is a 
crucial component of constitutionalism‖ that requires ―an authoritative 
 
 
 124. Post, supra note 105, at 30. In fact, a good number of normative theorists have severely 
criticized the legitimacy of constitutional judgments derived from the ethical mode on the ground that 
the Court can provide ―no particularly persuasive response to the counter-majoritarian difficulty‖ when 
it relies on this modality. Id. at 25. Some, therefore, are likely to conclude that a simple solution would 
be to banish the prudential and ethical modalities from the legitimate repertoire of constitutional 
interpretation while leaving judicial supremacy in tact. Even if it were desirable, it strikes me as 
exceptionally impractical to imagine that one can change established professional practices and habits 
by theoretical fiat—a fact that perhaps offers a more charitable explanation of Justice Scalia‘s 
observed inconsistencies. See, e.g., David M. Zlotnick, Justice Scalia and His Critics: An Exploration 
of Scalia‟s Fidelity to His Constitutional Methodology, 48 EMORY L.J. 1377, 1420–21 (1999) (arguing 
that ―the ‗as applied‘ critique[s] provide powerful evidence that, consciously or unconsciously, 
Scalia‘s values affect his analysis‖ and that ―those studies that retrace Scalia‘s historical steps or parse 
Scalia‘s logic do much to undermine his claims of judicial neutrality‖). 
 125. KRAMER, supra note 2, at 184–85 (describing Justice Story‘s argument for judicial 
supremacy in the 1830s).  
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interpreter whose interpretations bind all others.‖126 In light of this 
consideration, the public would be foolish to revoke consent every time 
the Court reached a conclusion that could not be attributed to its special 
competence.  
Judicial supremacy is appropriate where indeterminate meaning is 
stabilized despite critical reliance on modalities for which the Court cannot 
claim special competence. Put differently, where the Court succeeds in 
resolving constitutional ambiguity (i.e., deciding questions unanimously, 
or nearly unanimously, and consistently over time), it makes sense to defer 
to it.
127
 Brown v. Board of Education (1954) is a prime example.
128
 In light 
of this same systemic concern, the judiciary should get the first shot at 
resolving all constitutional questions that can be presented to it. 
On the other hand, contexts in which the Court, over extended periods, 
has failed to resolve constitutional debates may be appropriate subjects for 
shared interpretive authority. Judicial supremacy may reach its normative 
limits where the Court‘s interpretations arise out of modalities of argument 
for which it lacks special competence and it has failed to resolve 
ambiguity and bring settlement with respect to constitutional meaning. 
In this more limited but by no means insubstantial universe of cases, 
there is a plausible argument that the work of constitutional interpretation 
should be shared between the Supreme Court, the other branches of 
government, and the public itself unless there are countervailing concerns.  
As with other normative decisions, the ultimate decision of whether to 
revoke judicial supremacy is a matter of good judgment in the true 
Aristotelian sense.
129
 It cannot be delineated by rule or decided out of 
context. Still, it is worth listing the types of considerations that are likely 
to recur in our assessment of whether it would, all things considered, be 
wise to revoke the default rule of supremacy.
130
  
 
 
 126. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 29, at 1359. They argue further that ―the Supreme Court 
can best serve this role.‖ Id. 
 127. One does not need to agree with Justice Story or Professors Alexander and Schauer‘s precise 
assessment of the value of settlement to accept this proposition. 
 128. Cf. Griffin, supra note 1, at 121 (discussing how the plausibility of Alexander Bickel‘s 
defense of the comparative advantage of the Court in constitutional interpretation depended on the 
unanimity of the desegregation decisions and noting that ―[p]ersistent disagreement . . . discredit[s] the 
proposition that the five justices who prevailed were enforcing fundamental values‖). Brown‘s 
unanimity, and the fact it continued through Brown II and Cooper v. Aaron is particularly remarkable 
in light of the fact that between 1946 and 2010 only 31 percent of the Court‘s decisions involving 
constitutional questions were decided unanimously. See Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court 
Database, http://scdb.wustl.edu/index.php (last visited May 19, 2012). 
 129. See generally ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 146 (3d ed. 2007) (describing the 
Aristotelian tradition of virtue-based ethics). 
 130. Balancing the various considerations, discussed below, will be highly context-specific and 
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We are likely to be extremely reluctant to abandon judicial supremacy 
where the rights of minorities—discrete, insular and politically isolated 
ones—are at stake.131 The presence of individual rights, however, does not 
necessarily have to preclude shared interpretive responsibility. For 
instance, while the traditional affirmative action contexts of employment 
and higher education involve individual rights, it is not at all clear that the 
Court is the only hope for these rights-bearers.
132
 The political process is 
similarly a viable option for the protection of women‘s rights, though not 
necessarily for gay rights or the rights of prisoners.  
We are likely to find shared interpretive responsibility desirable where 
it would foster accountability through checks and balances or where it 
would enhance other aspects of democratic governance. Relevant values of 
American democracy in this regard include not only political participation 
and government responsiveness but also a tradition of federalism. By 
contrast, we should be wary of views of the co-equal branches of 
government where they are likely to be structurally tainted—e.g., the 
Executive‘s views on constitutional constraints on its prosecutorial role.  
We may also want to take into account the historical context. That is, 
we might ask whether the historical period is one of turmoil and instability 
in which decentralized decisionmaking risks constitutional crisis or a 
 
 
will certainly be subject to debate. Nevertheless, I believe it would be a mistake to offer a framework 
that failed to account for the fact that there will be situations where, not withstanding the fact that the 
Court‘s claim to expertise is at its lowest ebb, it would be unwise to revoke the default rule of 
supremacy. 
 131. Whittington, supra note 21, at 261 (noting salience of belief that the Court, as our only 
unelected institution, is uniquely positioned to protect the rights of individuals and minority groups 
against the darker sides of democracy); but see BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 56 
(2009); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and 
Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1934 (1995) 
(expressing frustration with those who refuse to acknowledge that the Court ―inevitabl[y] capitulat[es] 
to the dominant social norms‖). This work is an elaboration of the work of political scientist Robert 
Dahl in the middle of the twentieth-century. See Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: 
The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957). It has been criticized at some 
length recently. See Pildes, supra note 18, at 105. 
 132. If recent experience proves anything, it is that citizens who feel burdened by affirmative 
action programs in education and employment have been successful at organizing and campaigning to 
repeal such efforts. See, e.g., Dan Frosch, Vote Results Are Mixed On a Ban On Preference, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 8, 2008, at A19 (―In Nebraska, a proposed ban on affirmative action passed easily with 
nearly 58 percent of the vote.‖); Ethan Bronner, U. of Washington Will End Race-Conscious 
Admissions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1998, at A12 (―Washington is the second state, after California, to 
pass a voter initiative banning preferential treatment.‖); Robert Pear, In California, Foes of Affirmative 
Action See a New Day, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1996, at B7 (reporting that Californians approved a 
constitutional amendment prohibiting affirmative action ―by a vote of 54 percent to 46 percent‖). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1340 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:1309 
 
 
 
 
period of ossification in which we would benefit from the dissenting 
voices of the co-equal branches.  
Finally, we are likely to find that judicial supremacy is particularly 
problematic where the Court has come to operate as a forum for partisan 
politics. As Justice Stewart once noted:  
A basic change in the law upon a ground no firmer than a change in 
our membership invites the popular misconception that this 
institution is little different from the two political branches of the 
Government. No misconception could do more lasting injury to this 
Court and to the system of law which it is our abiding mission to 
serve.
133
 
It is not controversial that politicization undermines the judiciary‘s 
comparative advantage in constitutional interpretation.
134
  
C. Developing a Framework for Analyzing a Claim to Supremacy 
Pulling these various threads together, a framework for assessing when 
it is appropriate to revoke the default rule of finality is now imaginable. 
First, we will want to determine whether the Court is failing to provide 
resolution to constitutional ambiguity. If so, two further considerations 
arise: the Court‘s expertise relative to others, and the wisdom of 
challenging its determinations, all things considered. More specifically, 
two sets of questions emerge: (1) Is the Court‘s doctrine potentially open 
to challenge because the Supreme Court‘s claim to expertise is at its 
lowest ebb? Are the Court‘s views largely explained by ethical and 
prudential judgments? and (2) Would shared interpretive responsibility, all 
things considered, be a good idea? A preliminary list of considerations for 
the second question includes: implications for individual rights, especially 
those unlikely to be protected by the political process, implications for 
checks and balances, implications for political values, and implications for 
political stability. 
Notice that politicization has not made the list of considerations. 
Politicization cannot provide a neutral principle upon the basis of which to 
withdraw the default rule. If we could all agree that the Court had come to 
operate as a forum for brash politics over an issue, or in general, there is 
 
 
 133. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 636 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 134. See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 1, at 126 (noting that ―politicization undermines theories that 
assert that the Supreme Court has a comparative advantage over the elected branches in matters of 
principle‖). 
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no question that its claim to supremacy would be weak. In fact, the 
normative grounds for judicial review would also be radically undermined. 
The problem is that we cannot. People from different places along the 
political spectrum fundamentally disagree about when the Supreme Court 
is operating in an inappropriately politicized fashion. This is not 
surprising. The very purpose of the modalities of constitutional 
argumentation is to offer apolitical explanations for constitutional 
outcomes.  
The next obvious question is: How will the framework be 
operationalized? In particular, what should be the object of analysis?  
Although the framework could be applied to individual opinions, there 
are a number of reasons to focus on a chain of decisions addressing what 
the Constitution means with respect to the same issue. First, given the 
benefits of knowing where to go to resolve constitutional conflicts, the 
Court should get the first shot. In fact, the judiciary should be given more 
than one chance to resolve the interpretive question, given the radical 
consequences of revoking the default rule (discussed below). We ought to 
be certain that the Court has not just made a bad choice in one case. There 
will always be bad decisions, ones that are poorly reasoned or explained. 
The judiciary should be allowed to make mistakes.
135
 It should also have 
the first opportunity to correct its own errors.
136
 This is not to say that 
individual opinions cannot be criticized. It is only to say that it would be 
absurd to revoke the default rule of judicial supremacy based on a single 
opinion.  
Any doctrinal chain of decisions could work, but doctrinal chains of 
divided decisions are the places where the default rule is least valuable. 
For one, fractured decisions are an important indication that the default 
rule of supremacy is failing to provide the benefits of settlement. In any 
given case, the Court will have resolved the dispute, but it cannot be said 
to have brought closure to the underlying constitutional question. This is 
particularly true for cases that turn on the independent views of a single 
Justice. For another, a focus on doctrinal lines replete with fractured 
opinions allows us to address partially legitimate concerns about 
 
 
 135. In this regard, I am in (partial) agreement with Alexander and Schauer that officials and 
citizens should (sometimes) obey directives from mistaken courts. See Alexander & Schauer, supra 
note 29, at 1361, 1369, 1378–79. 
 136. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546–47 (1985) (Blackmun, J.) 
(rejecting ―as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice, a rule of state immunity from federal 
regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a particular governmental function is ‗integral‘ 
or ‗traditional‘‖ because ―[a]ny such rule leads to inconsistent results at the same time that it disserves 
principles of democratic self-governance, and . . . breeds inconsistency‖). 
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politicization. Fractured decisionmaking is an objective (albeit imperfect) 
proxy for politicization.
137
 
The central task is to decide whether the Court‘s views and conclusions 
ultimately derive from ethical or prudential modalities. Therefore, we will 
need to read carefully the opinions for the reasons they offer for their 
judgments.
138
 The particular focus will be on those parts of the opinions 
that directly address what the Constitution means.
139
  
This task, though laborious, has the added advantage of encouraging 
reflection on constitutional issues by nonjudicial actors. Those who 
disagree with the Court must actually read, analyze, and reflect on the 
arguments the Court has employed to justify its positions.  
If it turns out that the Court‘s competing views arise out of competing 
prudential and ethical arguments, we would turn to the question of 
whether, all things considered, shared interpretive authority is desirable in 
this context. Here, the analysis will turn on the considerations previously 
identified, although certain contexts may give rise to additional 
considerations.  
D. Imagining a Process for Revocation and a World Without Supremacy 
Finally, questions remain about how revocation would work. Who 
would make the determination that the Court‘s claim to supremacy was at 
its lowest ebb? Who would decide if shared interpretive authority was 
appropriate? How would such a decision be implemented? And, what 
would shared interpretive authority entail? There is no question that the 
mechanics would have to be worked out and a full answer to these 
questions would require an entire article. Still, some preliminary thoughts 
are in order. 
 
 
 137. It is true that unanimous decisions are not necessarily apolitical. It is also true that not all 
instances of divisions on the Court are political. Nevertheless, it is certainly plausible to worry that 
chains of five to four decisions are the most likely sites for judicial politics, if it exists. 
 138. For a useful conceptual framework for thinking about judicial products, see Roosevelt III, 
supra note 58, at 1191–93 (distinguishing between judgments and opinions). 
 139. As Roosevelt explains, constitutional decisionmaking is a three-step process:  
First, the Court must decide what the Constitution means . . . for instance, that the meaning of 
the Equal Protection Clause is that states may not discriminate in ways that stigmatize or 
contribute to the existence of a caste system. . . . Second, the Court must create a doctrinal 
test to implement this meaning. . . . Last, [the Court] applies this test to a particular set of 
facts.  
Id. at 1193–94. Roosevelt is not interested in how the Court reaches its account of meaning, and in 
polar opposition to my position here, he ultimately argues that ―the argument for judicial supremacy is 
straightforward‖ for determinations of constitutional meaning because ―[t]he Constitution is a legal 
text [and] [i]nterpreting legal texts is the work of lawyers and judges.‖ Id. at 1196. 
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The most pragmatic approach would be to require a formal trigger 
wherein the co-equal branches of government would undertake to revoke 
formally the default rule of judicial supremacy. A formal trigger ensures 
democratic accountability because challenges to judicial supremacy could 
not be made under the radar. Any public declaration of disagreement with 
the Court would most definitely be newsworthy. More importantly, it 
would require explanation. Perhaps most importantly, formal declarations 
are likely to involve an internal deliberative process.  
A range of existing structures could be used. The most uncontroversial 
option would be to require Congress to pass a joint resolution specifying 
the particular issue on which the co-equal branches were reinstating their 
independent authority to interpret the Constitution. Joint resolutions are, 
with minor technical exceptions, subject to the normal legislative process, 
including bicameralism and presentment, and go through its normal 
forums for debate, discussion, and input from the public.
140
  
The joint resolution process would allow Congress to explain the basis 
for the decision according to the proposed framework.
141
 One key 
distinction between a joint resolution and a bill is that the former may 
include a preamble.
142
 The preamble could be used to include findings to 
show that the Supreme Court had been given the first shot at resolving a 
difficult constitutional question, had failed to do so over time as evidenced 
by a series of split decisions based on competing understandings of the 
Constitution‘s meaning, and that the various positions on the Court largely 
turned on modes of interpretation that, while valid, are not uniquely within 
 
 
 140. Joint resolutions are subject to the constitutional requirement of bicameralism and 
presentment. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; accord 7 DESCHLER‘S PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES Ch. 24, § 4; see also H.R. DOC. NO. 108-93, at 7 (2003) (―Joint resolutions, with 
the exception of proposed amendments to the Constitution, become law in the same manner as bills.‖). 
Congress could, of course, opt to pass a statute defying the prevailing judicial interpretation of the 
Constitution and include a similar declaration as part of a preamble to the Act. The risk of this 
approach as a triggering mechanism is that Congress will presumably have a much greater incentive to 
revoke the default rule when it has already decided on a substantive course. As such, the framework 
analysis required is likely to be less of a priority than deliberations over the substance of the 
provisions. Put simply, the risk is that there will be sufficient support for the statute in Congress that it 
will forge ahead, asserting its independent authority to interpret the Constitution in unwarranted 
situations. 
 141. Note that what would not be acceptable are justifications along the lines of ―‗Enough has 
been done for those who murder and rape and rob! It is time to do something for those who do not 
wish to be murdered or raped or robbed.‘‖ Powe, Jr., supra note 7, at 874 (attributing statement to 
Senator Sam Ervin during the congressional debate on the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act). 
 142. See H.R. DOC. NO. 108-93, supra note 140, at 7 (noting that the resolving clause in a joint 
resolution ―is frequently preceded by a preamble consisting of one or more ‗whereas‘ clauses 
indicating the necessity for or the desirability of the joint resolution‖). 
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the judiciary‘s expertise.143 It is also not uncommon for a joint resolution 
to be accompanied by a legislative report, which could add support and 
explanation to the legislatively adopted findings in the preamble.
144
 
While obviously legitimate, a joint resolution, insofar as it requires 
united opposition to the Court, may set the bar too high. Another option 
would be to allow Congress to set out its views in an unsigned joint 
resolution. This would have added symbolic value, as such joint 
resolutions are how constitutional amendments are proposed.
145
 With less 
symbolism, Congress could simply pass a concurrent resolution. Although 
concurrent resolutions do not create binding law, they do provide 
Congress the ability to stake out a constitutional position for the public to 
consider.
146
 Thereafter, Congress could try to legislate consistent with its 
views. 
Similarly, the President could sign an executive order articulating his 
decision to reassert authority over constitutional interpretation in a 
particular area. Executive orders are subject to an established, uniform 
process in which, first, the Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget must approve the proposed order and, second, the Attorney 
General must consider both the form and legality of it.
147
 Only after both 
have approved the draft language will it be presented to the President. 
Proposed executive orders that have not received the approval of these two 
senior officials may only be presented to the President if they are 
―accompanied by a statement of the reasons for such disapproval.‖148 As 
 
 
 143. 7 DESCHLER‘S Ch. 24, § 4 n.18 (noting further that the findings in the preamble of a joint 
resolution ―are amendable after engrossment and prior to third reading of the joint resolution‖). 
 144. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 111-448 (2010). 
 145. Cf. 7 DESCHLER‘S Ch. 24, § 4 (explaining that joint resolutions amending the Constitution 
are not presented to the President). 
 146. See generally RIDDICK‘S SENATE PROCEDURE: PRECEDENTS AND PRACTICES, 442–48, 1202–
13 (explaining, inter alia, that concurrent resolutions are passed by both Chambers in identical form 
but are not presented to the President and thus are not binding law); Louis Fischer, The Legislative 
Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 273, 276 (1993) (noting that it is 
uncontroversial that absent presentment, a simple or concurrent resolution lacks legislative, i.e., 
binding legal, force). This process would essentially be the same as a ―Sense of Congress‖ resolution, 
which are frequently undertaken to express opinions about subjects of current national interest. See 
generally Paul S. Rundquist, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-82, ―SENSE OF‖ RESOLUTIONS AND 
PROVISIONS (2003). There is also the possibility that each chamber of Congress could express its 
independent ―Sense‖ of the constitutional question using a simple resolution, but it strikes me that this 
would encourage politicization of the interpretive process at the same time that it would not be the 
constitutional position of a co-equal branch of government. 
 147. 1 C.F.R. § 19.2(a)-(b) (2011). 
 148. Id. § 19.2(e). 
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with a resolution, an executive order would be public and subject to 
congressional ratification or challenge.
149
 
Each of these formal mechanisms utilizes forums capable of analysis 
and deliberation and thus could accommodate the type of analysis required 
by the proposed framework. Moreover, the publicity that any would 
provoke would trigger constitutional interpretation and argument in the 
public sphere.  
The public‘s voice in the revocation process would generally mirror the 
public‘s current voice in our elected branches of government. There would 
be room for constituents (including lawyers and academics) to lobby for 
and against the need to revoke judicial supremacy and to justify or criticize 
revocation after the fact.
150
 
Assuming that revocation occurs, what would shared interpretive 
authority look like? The first thing to reiterate is that shared interpretive 
authority is not a matter of denying the Court a say. It is a matter of 
denying the Court the final say.  
Judicial review would remain even for issues where the default rule of 
supremacy had been revoked. Cases involving constitutional issues subject 
to shared interpretive authority would continue to filter through the court 
system. Courts would continue to get their say.  
The critical difference would be that since those ―judicial decisions 
[would] not [be] supreme, they [could] be ignored or defied.‖151 On the 
part of Congress, we would expect, therefore, exactly the behavior to 
which the Court in City of Boerne v. Flores (1997) objected: The enacting 
or reenacting of legislation vindicating a competing view of the 
Constitution.
152
 On the part of the Executive, we might expect to see the 
President refuse to enforce legislation that the Court had held 
constitutional.
153
 Inversely, the Department of Justice might continue to 
 
 
 149. See 44 U.S.C. § 1505(a)(1) (2011) (requiring publication of executive orders so long as they 
have ―general applicability and legal effect‖). 
 150. For example, although executive orders typically originate from within the Executive Branch, 
either from agencies or directly from the White House, outside parties occasionally propose draft 
language. See Robert C. Wigton, Recent Presidential Experience with Executive Orders, 26 
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 473, 476–77 (1996) (noting that the executive order that promulgated the 
―Don‘t Ask, Don‘t Tell‖ policy for the military involved negotiations including the President, 
Congress and the military). 
 151. Friedman, supra note 23, at 431. 
 152. For a detailed discussion of the Boerne Court‘s views, see infra notes 166–71, 181 and 
accompanying text. 
 153. Cf. Paulsen, supra note 45, at 272 (arguing that if co-equal interpretive authority exists, it 
applies both in the absence and in the presence of a contrary judicial interpretation). 
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enforce legislation that the Court has struck down.
154
 Now and again, we 
might have a replay of Marbury, with the President ordering his officials 
to refuse to show up to Court.  
At the same time, we are likely to continue to see a lot of what we 
currently see. Congress, the President, political candidates, and members 
of the public will continue to assert constitutional views and analyses both 
inside and outside of court. Congress will refuse to pass measures that it 
considers unconstitutional, and the President will exercise his veto power 
on those grounds. The Executive may also refuse to enforce statutes it 
considers unconstitutional. All the while, advocates will seek to persuade 
the courts, and the other branches, of the soundness of their 
interpretations.
155
  
What would not be appropriate would be the kind of judicial 
intimidation recently proposed by Newt Gingrich.
156
 Violence or threats of 
violence on the part of the public or government officials obviously would 
be off limits. Court-packing plans and jurisdiction-stripping efforts are 
also inappropriately coercive.
157
  
The Court, as a co-equal branch of government, is entitled to an 
independent view of the Constitution. Any effort to coerce the Court to 
change its views or to compromise its relative independence from politics 
is illegitimate. Concerted efforts to skew judicial appointments to ensure 
particular reversals are questionable in this regard.
158
 The Court was 
established as a countermajoritarian institution, intentionally insulated 
from current political predilictions. So long as there are majoritarian 
constitutional avenues, there is no countermajoritarian difficulty, only a 
functioning system of checks and balances.  
In all this, the public is left with an important role. Conflict between 
the co-equal branches will have to be resolved in the political process—
both at elections and in the public sphere. The editorial and opinion pages 
 
 
 154. See id. at 267–68 (describing longstanding presidential practice of refusing to execute 
statutes considered unconstitutional). 
 155. Cf. Roosevelt III, supra note 58, at 1195 (noting currently various actors ―try[] to persuade 
the Court, through appointments or arguments in the course of litigation‖). 
 156. See Eric Posner, Newt Gingrich and the Supreme Court: The Liberal Scholars Who Support 
His Critique on Judicial Supremacy, SLATE MAG., Dec. 20, 2011 (noting that Gingrich‘s position 
paper ―argue[s] that when the president and Congress believe that the judiciary has rendered decisions 
that violate the Constitution, they should be willing to impeach judges, strip them of jurisdiction, haul 
them before congressional committees, and abolish courts‖), available at http://www.slate.com/articles 
/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/12/newt_gingrich_and_the_supreme_court_the_liberal_schola
rs_who_support_his_critique_on_judicial_supremacy_.html (last visited May 30, 2012). 
 157. Cf. Powe, Jr., supra note 7, at 872–74 (discussing the impact of a failed effort to strip the 
judiciary of jurisdiction over anticommunist programs on the Supreme Court‘s jurisprudence). 
 158. Cf. id. at 881 (discussing judicial appointments strategy of abortion foes). 
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of major newspapers, magazines, certain radio programs, and at least some 
blogs, including some quite exceptional blogs on constitutional issues, 
would have an important role to play in educating the voting public and 
keeping all three branches in line.  
The New Departmentalism proposed here is both more pragmatic and 
normatively superior to mechanisms that advocate the adoption of some 
form of national referendum.
159
 Direct democracy is not up to the task of 
constitutional interpretation. It is decidedly un-deliberative, even anti-
deliberative, with commercials and polls driving the political process. 
Referenda, moreover, suffer from all of the legitimacy concerns that 
plague the rest of American politics, not least of which include chronically 
low voter turnout and the role of money in campaigns and recently even 
(―Astroturf‖) political movements. With all this in mind, it is time to 
illustrate how the proposed framework might be used. 
IV. RACE AND REPRESENTATION—APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK 
The Supreme Court‘s recent jurisprudence with respect to race and 
democratic representation is on a collision course with progressive 
understandings of the constitutional promise of the civil rights movement. 
The Roberts Court has positioned itself to declare unconstitutional key 
provisions of the Voting Rights Act (―VRA‖)—the most venerated and 
effective piece of civil rights legislation to date.
160
 Were that to happen, 
states would be prohibited from acknowledging the importance of race in 
political life by intentionally creating integrated legislative bodies. This is 
because without the VRA, race-conscious districting, which is already on 
precarious constitutional footing, would become effectively impossible to 
justify under existing doctrine. 
Constitutional constraints on a state‘s ability to consider race as a 
relevant axis for political representation pose a host of theoretically 
interesting questions for any theory of decentralized interpretive authority. 
While most contemporary constitutional fights are either about individual 
rights or about the structure of government, questions regarding race and 
democracy sit at the intersection of structure and rights. Moreover, as a 
practical matter, these questions arise in the context of redistricting, which 
 
 
 159. But see Tom Donnelly, The „People‟s Veto‟: A Way to Keep the Courts in Check, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 29, 2011, at A17. (advocating for the revival of Progressive reforms to allow the recall of 
judicial decisions); Tom Donnelly, Making Popular Constitutionalism Work 7, 27–30 (Harvard Public 
Law, Working Paper No. 11-29 Nov. 21, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1962580. 
 160. Cf. NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2506 (2009). 
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is typically undertaken by state officials—thereby raising the particularly 
thorny question of whether state legislatures should be entitled to entertain 
independent views of the Constitution. 
The impending controversy arises out of two intersecting lines of 
precedent: Shaw v. Reno (1993) and its progeny, which define the 
constitutional limits of race-conscious legislative districting, and City of 
Boerne v. Flores (1997) and its progeny, which narrowly construe 
Congress‘ power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the 
Amendment‘s substantive guarantees.161  
In Shaw, the Court established, over four dissents, a cause of action 
under the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Equal Protection Clause, where a 
redistricting plan ―is so bizarre on its face that it is ‗unexplainable on 
grounds other than race.‘‖162 Despite a significant degree of uncertainty 
about the doctrine, a majority of the Court has taken the position post-
Shaw that where a state engages in race-conscious legislative districting, 
its actions will be subject to strict scrutiny so long as it is established that 
consideration of race was the predominant factor explaining the state‘s 
choices.
163
 A state can only prevail under strict scrutiny if it: (1) offers a 
compelling interest for having allowed racial considerations to 
predominate and (2) demonstrates that racial demographics were only 
considered to the degree necessary to further the stated compelling 
interest.
164
  
To date, a need to comply with the VRA has been the only compelling 
interest that this same majority has been willing to entertain.
165
 The 
 
 
 161. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). See 
also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (explicitly empowering Congress to enforce the Amendment‘s 
substantive provisions, including the Equal Protection Clause, ―by appropriate legislation‖). 
 162. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 644. 
 163. The controversy primarily revolves around the nature of the cause of action. See Miller v. 
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (clarifying that a constitutional violation occurs when race is the 
―predominant factor‖ in the drawing of district lines and it cannot be justified under strict scrutiny). 
That districts subject to a Shaw challenge would be subject to strict scrutiny was never disputed within 
the majority. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 643–44 (holding that plans covered by the new cause of action 
would be subject to strict scrutiny). 
 164. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 920–21. 
 165. From the beginning, the suggestion that compliance with VRA could qualify as a compelling 
state interest has come with numerous caveats. See, e.g., id. at 921 (―Whether or not in some cases 
compliance with the [VRA], standing alone, can provide a compelling interest independent of any 
interest in remedying past discrimination, it cannot do so here.‖); Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw II), 517 U.S. 
899, 908 n.4, 911, 915 (1996) (hedging as to whether compliance with VRA would qualify as a 
compelling state interest). Even Justice O‘Connor (the most sympathetic member in the conservative 
coalition at the time) offered mixed signals when she addressed the issue in Bush v. Vera. See 517 U.S. 
952, 992, 990 (1996) (O‘Connor, J., concurring) (equivocating by ultimately asserting that ―[w]e 
should allow States to assume the constitutionality of § 2 of the VRA, including the 1982 
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constitutionality of the two central provisions of the VRA, however, is 
shrouded in doubt, in light of Boerne.  
In Boerne, the Court considered the constitutionality of the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, a law enacted by Congress to restore a judicial 
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause that the Court had recently 
overturned.
166
 The Court held the Act unconstitutional.
167
 In doing so, the 
Court significantly narrowed the scope of Congress‘ § 5 powers, declaring 
that Congress ―has been given the power ‗to enforce,‘ not the power to 
determine what constitutes a constitutional violation.
‖168
 In particular, 
while Congress may enact ―[l]egislation which deters or remedies 
constitutional violations . . . even if in the process it prohibits conduct 
which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into legislative spheres of 
autonomy previously reserved to the States,‖169 it may do so only where it 
is enforcing the Court‘s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.170 
The decision, in other words, was also a clear statement of judicial 
supremacy, with the Court asserting exclusive and final interpretive 
authority over the Constitution.
171
  
The congruence and proportionality test established to police Congress, 
in this regard, has proven very difficult to meet, and it is unlikely that the 
evidence of racial discrimination before Congress when it renewed either § 
2 or § 5—the primary substantive provisions—of the VRA would survive 
a Boerne challenge.
172
  
Section 5 requires certain covered jurisdictions—those that by various 
measures had suppressed electoral turnout between 1964 and 1972—to 
 
 
amendments‖ even though the Court had only ―assum[ed] but never directly address[ed] its 
constitutionality‖) (emphasis added). 
 166. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512–15. 
 167. Id. at 511. 
 168. Id. at 519. 
 169. Id. at 518 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 170. Id. at 519 (rejecting ―the suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the substance of 
the Fourteenth Amendment‘s restrictions on the States‖ because ―Congress does not enforce a 
constitutional right by changing what the right is‖). 
 171. Id. at 545 (―Congress lacks the ‗power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth 
Amendment‘s restrictions on the States.‘‖); see also id. at 535–36. Boerne must be seen as extending 
Cooper v. Aaron (1958), which only involved supremacy over state officials‘ interpretations of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Only Justice Breyer asserted that there was no need to reach this issue and 
expressed hesitation regarding the position. See id. at 566. 
 172. Id. at 520 (―There must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be 
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.‖); see, e.g., Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. 
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel v Fla. Bd. of 
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); but see Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
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seek preclearance for any changes related to voting.
173
 Preclearance is only 
permissible where the change ―does not have the purpose and will not 
have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race 
or color.‖174 The significant constitutional problem for § 5 is that the Court 
is unlikely to see the current provision, which was recently reenacted, as a 
lawful exercise of Congress‘ enforcement power. Under Boerne, § 5 is 
only constitutional if it was enacted to remedy racial discrimination that 
the Court would recognize as unconstitutional.
175
 The record of intentional 
discrimination against minority voters, because of their race, which 
Congress relied on in 2006 in reenacting § 5, is unlikely to seem robust to 
the Court.
176
 Even if this hurdle could be cleared, the Court is unlikely to 
find that the record justifies either the scope of the intrusion or intruding 
on the sovereignty of the particular states covered.
177
  
The constitutionality of § 2 is similarly vulnerable. Section 2 operates 
nationwide and forbids any ―standard, practice, or procedure‖ that ―results 
in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United States to 
 
 
 173. Covered jurisdictions are defined by § 4 of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (defining 
covered jurisdictions as ones that used a test or device as a prerequisite to voting and failed either to 
register or turn out 50 percent of eligible voters in the definitional years). 
 174. Id. § 1973a(c). 
 175. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–42 (1976) (holding that evidence of a 
discriminatory purpose is required to prove an equal protection violation where the government action 
is otherwise facially neutral). 
 176. In 2009, the constitutionality of § 5 was presented to the Court. While it opted to decide the 
case on narrower statutory grounds given the unique and limited facts of the case, the Court strongly 
signaled openness to the constitutional challenge: 
Some of the conditions that we relied upon in upholding this statutory scheme . . . have 
unquestionably improved. Things have changed in the South. Voter turnout and registration 
rates now approach parity. Blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare. And 
minority candidates hold office at unprecedented levels. These improvements are no doubt 
due in significant part to the Voting Rights Act itself, and stand as a monument to its success. 
Past success alone, however, is not adequate justification to retain the preclearance 
requirements. It may be that these improvements are insufficient and that conditions continue 
to warrant preclearance under the Act. But the Act imposes current burdens and must be 
justified by current needs. 
NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2511–12 (internal citations omitted). 
 177. The Court explicitly questioned the coverage formula: 
The evil that § 5 is meant to address may no longer be concentrated in the jurisdictions 
singled out for preclearance. The statute‘s coverage formula is based on data that is now 
more than 35 years old, and there is considerable evidence that it fails to account for current 
political conditions. For example, the racial gap in voter registration and turnout is lower in 
the States originally covered by § 5 than it is nationwide. 
See id. at 2512; accord Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 
YALE L.J. 174, 208 (2007) (―The most one can say in defense of the [coverage] formula is that it is the 
best of the politically feasible alternatives or that changing the formula would . . . disrupt settled 
expectations.‖). 
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vote on account of race or color.‖178 Once again, it is unclear whether the 
record of intentional discrimination before Congress when it amended § 2 
in 1982 would be considered sufficient to justify its remedial obligations 
or its national application.
179
 Section 2 is additionally vulnerable because 
there is a good deal of (albeit ambiguous) evidence in the legislative 
record that Congress sought to reverse a recent Court decision.
180
 The 
Boerne Court specifically rebuked Congress for debating the merits of its 
most recent religion case and articulating among the Act‘s purposes a 
desire to reestablish the Court‘s previous interpretation of the Free 
Exercise Clause.
181
  
Were the Supreme Court to strike down either or both of these core 
provisions of the VRA, there is a real risk that Congress and state 
legislatures would return to being as white as they were in 1965.
182
 This 
might give pause to the American public as well as our elected officials, 
who might wonder whether they should consent to the Court‘s having the 
final word on this particular issue after all. 
The desire to revoke the default rule need not arise out of certainty that 
race-conscious districting is either constitutional or desirable.
183
 Various 
 
 
 178. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a). 
 179. See Ellen D. Katz, Reinforcing Representation: Congressional Power to Enforce the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in the Rehnquist and Waite Courts, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2341, 
2346 (2003) (noting that ―the constitutionality of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is currently an 
open question‖); Luke P. McLoughlin, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and City of Boerne: The 
Continuity, Proximity, and Trajectory of Vote-Dilution Standards, 31 VT. L. REV. 39, 43 (2006) 
(noting that there has not been ―a direct City of Boerne challenge to section 2‖). Lower courts have 
uniformly upheld the amended § 2 against constitutional attack. See, e.g., United States v. Blaine 
Cnty., Mont., 363 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming on the basis of the Court‘s summary affirmance 
in Miss. Republican Exec. Comm. v. Brooks, 469 U.S. 1002 (1984)). See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 
1034–35 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (clearly summarizing the controversy). 
 180. See Miss. Republican Exec. Comm. v. Brooks, 469 U.S. at 1010–11 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). In particular, Congress expressed some concern about City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 
55 (1980), a case that extended Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), to voting rights. 
 181. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 515 (1997). 
 182. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Race, Voting Rights, and the Genius of Justice Souter, THE 
AMERICAN PROSPECT, May 1, 2009, available at http://prospect.org/cs/articles?article=race_voting_ 
rights_and_the_genius_of_justice_souter (―In a world of racial bloc voting, race-blind districting is 
simply a recipe for disempowering racial minorities.‖); Pamela S. Karlan, Our Separatism? Voting 
Rights as an American Nationalities Policy, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 83, 97 (1995) (―Without the 
Voting Rights Act and race-conscious districting, then, the complexion of the American legislative 
branches would be decidedly lighter, and in the Deep South would be virtually all white.‖). 
 183. Race-conscious districting is highly controversial, even among liberals, who recognize the 
tradeoff between facilitating descriptive representation and electing legislative bodies willing to pass 
the substantive agendas supported by a majority of minority voters. For a variety of views, compare 
Michael S. Kang, Race and Democratic Contestation, 117 YALE L.J. 734 (2008), with Pamela S. 
Karlan, Loss and Redemption: Voting Rights at the Turn of a Century, 50 VAND. L. REV. 291 (1997), 
with David Ian Lublin, Race, Representation, and Redistricting, in CLASSIFYING BY RACE 111 (Paul E. 
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actors might simply believe that the question of whether the Constitution 
constrains our ability to address the continued salience of race in America, 
as we create our representative institutions, is one that would benefit from 
wider constitutional and political debate. 
Our question is whether it would be appropriate to revoke the default 
rule of supremacy. For the purposes of the framework set out in Part III, 
the key line of cases to review are those in which the Court has addressed 
the question of whether the Equal Protection Clause prohibits affirmative 
action, defined broadly as race-conscious programs designed to alleviate 
or remedy disadvantages experienced by racial minorities whatever their 
cause (i.e., present state action, past state action, or private preference).
184
 
This is because Shaw is an outgrowth of that line of precedent.
185
 
Since 1977, when the Court first confronted the question of the degree 
to which the Constitution constrains the government‘s ability to remedy 
racial inequality through race-conscious policies, it has issued eighteen 
decisions on the merits, in the contexts of voting, employment, 
government contracts, and education.
186
 All of these cases involved 
 
 
Petersen ed., 1995). See also Bernard Grofman & Lisa Handley, 1990s Issues in Voting Rights, 65 
MISS. L.J. 205 (1995). 
 184. To clarify, for purposes of this Article, it is the foundation of the Court‘s views about race-
conscious districting and the Equal Protection Clause that is being studied. This is a separate question 
from the foundation of its views about whether the Equal Protection Clause only prohibits intentional 
racial discrimination on which its ultimate views on the constitutionality of the VRA partially depend. 
That said, this entire Article challenges the Supreme Court‘s understanding of judicial supremacy, 
articulated in Boerne, and as such may have some bearing on the appropriateness of holding the VRA 
unconstitutional pursuant to the currently accepted narrow interpretation of Congress‘s § 5 power. 
 185. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing 
Constitutional Lines after Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 650 (1993) (noting that ―Shaw 
follows its doctrinal progenitors, most notably Bakke‖). Although the Fifteenth Amendment explicitly 
prohibits disenfranchisement on the basis of race, it does not address second-order questions of 
political representation, such as the structuring of legislative districts, and the Supreme Court has 
decided to use the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Equal Protection Clause as the basis of its jurisprudence 
in this area. But see Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (finding racial gerrymander in 
question constituted a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment). 
 186. United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburg v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (voting); Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (education); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) 
(government contracts); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (employment); Local 
28 of the Sheet Metal Workers‘ Int‘l Ass‘n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986) (employment); United 
States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (employment); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 
469 (1989) (government contracts); Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) overruled, in 
part, by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. at 227 (licensing); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 
(1993) (voting); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (government contracting); 
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (voting); Shaw II, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) (voting); Bush v. Vera, 
517 U.S. 952 (1996) (voting); Hunt v. Cromartie (Shaw III), 526 U.S. 541 (1999) (voting); Easley v. 
Cromartie (Shaw IV), 532 U.S. 234 (2001) (voting); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) 
(eduation); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (education); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (education). Excluded from this list are cases where the 
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challenges to race-conscious remedial policies, and in each, the Court 
wrestled with ―the proper meaning of the Equal Protection Clause‖ in 
some way.
187
 
These eighteen cases have produced a total of eighty-six opinions. 
Only one was decided unanimously, although even there the Court 
fractured in its reasoning.
188
 Twelve of these decisions (or 67 percent) 
were decided five to four.
189
 By way of comparison, 24 percent of the 
Court‘s decisions involving constitutional questions during this period 
were decided five to four.
190
  
Divisions regarding constitutional meaning run deep and confusion is 
rampant. It is not uncommon for both the majority and the dissent to be 
fractured—with Justices signing onto only some parts of the primary 
majority or dissent or writing separately. These are not cases in which the 
Court agrees about core constitutional values but disagrees about how to 
apply them or cases where it has settled on an unworkable doctrinal test.  
Although the most common modality of argument in this set of cases is 
doctrinal, the volume of precedent invoked appears to be inversely related 
to its ability to determine the outcome.
191
 This was all too apparent in the 
 
 
issue was found to be moot, the plaintiffs were found to lack standing or in which certiorari was denied 
over dissent. See, e.g., DeFunis v Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (dismissed on grounds of mootness) 
(education); Tex. v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18, 22 (1999) (per curiam) (upholding district court‘s grant of 
summary judgment where the individual student‘s alleged discrimination claim was not viable on the 
facts). Additionally, Morton v Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), was also excluded given the Court‘s 
emphasis on the special constitutional powers conferred on Congress with respect to regulating Indian 
tribes and its determination that the classification was not racial insofar as the preference was for 
members of federally recognized tribes. 417 U.S. at 454–55. 
 187. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 355 (Brennan, J.) (beginning his analysis by declaring that ―the position 
that such factors [including color or creed] must be ‗constitutionally an irrelevance,‘ summed up by 
the shorthand phrase ‗[o]ur Constitution is colorblind‘ has never been adopted by this Court as the 
proper meaning of the Equal Protection Clause‖) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). In the 
areas of education and employment, affirmative action takes the form of explicit racial classifications. 
In the context of legislative districting, the statutes are formally neutral but are designed to create 
majority-minority districts and thus are race-conscious. See, e.g., Shaw, 509 U.S. at 643. 
 188. That decision was Shaw III, in which the Court held that the district court‘s grant of summary 
judgment was inappropriate because factual questions remained as to the motivation of the legislature. 
Shaw III, 526 U.S. at 553. Shaw III, like Shaw IV, arguably should have been excluded from the 
sample; however, I decided to err on the side of inclusion, because the divisions on the Court in these 
two cases were a product of each wing‘s desire to reify a particular reading of Shaw. The fight over 
constitutional meaning is now fought through competing characterizations of precedent. 
 189. Among the seven cases relating to voting, all have involved race-conscious legislative 
districting. Five were decided five to four; one was decided seven to one; and one was unanimous. 
 190. See Spaeth, supra note 128 (showing that, between 1977–2009, 24 percent of Supreme Court 
decisions involving a constitutional question were split five to four). 
 191. Each of these opinions was read, analyzed, and coded according to Bobbitt‘s six modalities. 
Every decision, frequently every opinion within a decision, involved multiple paragraphs of doctrinal 
analysis. Nondoctrinal forms of argument that appeared with case citations were coded as both. 
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Court‘s most recent affirmative action decision, Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 (2007), in which the 
Justices split over the appropriate level of scrutiny. For one side, Justice 
Breyer chastised, ―[N]o case—not Adarand, Gratz, Grutter, or any 
other—has ever held that the test of ‗strict scrutiny‘ means that all racial 
classifications—no matter whether they seek to include or exclude—must 
in practice be treated the same.‖192 Chief Justice Roberts responded that 
the Court‘s precedent clearly required all racial classifications to be 
subject to a uniform strict scrutiny standard.
193
 Justice Kennedy, however, 
refused to join this part of Roberts‘ opinion.194 This fight over the 
appropriate level of scrutiny first surfaced thirty years earlier in Bakke,
195
 
and the persistence of the disagreement had been foreshadowed in Grutter 
v. Bollinger (2003).
196
  
Profound disagreement about the import of prior precedent runs 
through the eighteen cases. In United Jewish Organizations of 
Williamsburg v. Carey (1977), the first of these cases, the Justices fought 
over the true meaning of Gomillion v. Lightfoot (1960).
197
 A year later, in 
Bakke, the fight was over the true meaning of United States v. Carolene 
Products Co. (1938).
198
 In Parents Involved, the Justices were also at odds 
 
 
 192. 551 U.S. 701, 832 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Breyer continued: ―Indeed, in its more 
recent opinions, the Court recognized that the ‗fundamental purpose‘ of strict scrutiny review is to 
‗take relevant differences‘ between ‗fundamentally different situations . . . into account.‘ . . . That is, it 
is not in all circumstances ‗strict in theory, but fatal in fact.‘‖ Id. at 832–33 (quoting Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 228, 237 (1995)). 
 193. Id. at 741–43 (plurality) (Roberts, C.J.). 
 194. Id. at 707 (noting Justice Kennedy did not sign on to Part III.C, the plurality‘s discussion of 
the standard of review); see also id. at 787–88 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (articulating disagreements 
with the plurality‘s perspectives). 
 195. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287–91, 300–05, 356–62 (in which the 
parties asked the Court to choose between strict scrutiny and rational basis review and four Justices 
adopted intermediate scrutiny while Justice Powell argued for strict scrutiny). 
 196. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 346 n* (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting that the 
case ―[did] not require the Court to revisit whether all governmental classifications by race, whether 
designed to benefit or to burden a historically disadvantaged group, should be subject to the same 
standard of judicial review‖ and indicating that there might be additional state interests that ―rank as 
sufficiently important to justify a race-conscious government program‖). 
 197. Compare 430 U.S. 144, 165 (1977) (White, J.) (noting that unlike in Gomillion and other 
similar cases ―there was no fencing out of the white population from participation in the political 
process‖), with id. at 181 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the case should be controlled by 
Gomillion which stood for the proposition ―that [the] drawing of political boundary lines with the sole, 
explicit objective of reaching a predetermined racial result cannot ordinarily be squared with the 
Constitution‖). 
 198. Compare 438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978) (plurality) (Powell, J.) (arguing that footnote 4 of United 
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., ―has never been invoked in our decisions as a prerequisite to subjecting 
racial or ethnic distinctions to strict scrutiny‖ (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co, 304 U.S. 
144, 152 n.4 (1938)), with id. at 357 (arguing that strict scrutiny is not the appropriate level of scrutiny 
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over the true meaning of Brown and the subsequent school desegregation 
cases.
199
 
Doctrine completely fails to serve its purpose of stabilizing meaning—
despite being the most frequent modality of constitutional interpretation in 
these cases.
200
 Justice Stevens implicitly acknowledged this in his separate 
dissent in Parents Involved when he stated that the Court‘s ―only 
justification for refusing to acknowledge the obvious importance of [the] 
difference‖ between racial classifications that impose burdens in order to 
stigmatize and exclude and those that do not ―is the citation of a few 
recent opinions—none of which even approached unanimity—grandly 
proclaiming that all racial classifications must be analyzed under ‗strict 
scrutiny.‘‖201 
The three remaining modalities of constitutional interpretation for 
which the Justices are uniquely competent (textual, historical, and 
structural) are relatively infrequently invoked. They have not been the 
primary source of division on the Court. 
Textual arguments are surprisingly infrequent.
202
 The most extensive 
textual arguments were offered by Justice Powell‘s separate opinion in 
Bakke, in which he quoted the text of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
demonstrate that the rights it establishes are individual rights and thus 
―cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and something 
else when applied to a person of another color.‖203 In doing so, he 
 
 
because whites do not suffer ―any of the ‗traditional indicia of suspectness‘‖ identified in Carolene 
Prods. Co.). 
 199. Compare 551 U.S. at 747 (Roberts, C.J.) (arguing that the majority‘s position was faithful to 
the NAACP‘s primary contention in Brown ―‗that no state has any authority under the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to use race as a factor in affording educational opportunities 
among its citizens‘‖) (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Brown v. Board of Education of 
Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)), with id. at 798–99 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated:  
There is a cruel irony in THE CHIEF JUSTICE‘s reliance on our decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education. . . . THE CHIEF JUSTICE fails to note that it was only black school children who 
were so ordered; indeed, the history books do not tell stories of white children struggling to 
attend black schools. In this and other ways, THE CHIEF JUSTICE rewrites the history of one of 
this Court‘s most important decisions. 
Id. 
 200. Cf. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 921–22 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (noting 
that precedent is a valuable means of interpreting the Constitution only to the degree that it has the 
―ability to contribute to the stable and orderly development of the law‖). 
 201. 551 U.S. at 799–800 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).  
 202. While every decision involved a doctrinal argument, just under half of the decisions involved 
any textual discussion. This was frequently in only one opinion. Even this statement overestimates the 
prevalence of textual arguments since where they were present, they were extremely brief. See supra 
note 191 (describing coding process). 
 203. 438 U.S. at 289–90. The textual argument appears in a single paragraph with two subsequent 
references to it brought up while responding to competing interpretations. The argument was offered to 
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emphasized that the text of the Amendment makes no ―reference to color, 
ethnic origin, or condition of prior servitude.‖204 The other opinions in the 
decision did not respond in the textual modality. Powell‘s textual 
argument has occasionally been replicated in subsequent cases.
205
 
The infrequent resort to a textual modality can be explained by the fact 
that the Equal Protection Clause states only: ―nor shall any State . . . deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.‖206 It 
thus provides little guidance, especially when the question is narrowed to, 
for example, whether the Fourteenth Amendment constrains a state from 
considering the salience of race in politics when it creates its 
representative institutions. 
While the historical modality is invoked more frequently, little weight 
has been placed on it.
207
 Even the Justices who are theoretically committed 
to originalism only rarely make use of the historical arguments. Justice 
Thomas devoted a single footnote in Parents Involved to respond to the 
available historical evidence.
208
 
This is likely because the legislative history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is sparse on the import of its substantive provisions,
209
 and we 
know virtually nothing about the views of the ratifiers.
210
 To the degree 
that there is any evidence regarding the original understanding of the 
constitutionality of race-conscious remedial state action, the evidence is 
 
 
diffuse the objection that ―the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment conceived of its primary 
function as bridging the vast distance between members of the Negro race and the white ‗majority.‘‖ 
Id. at 293.  
 204. Id. at 293. 
 205. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (O‘Connor, J.) (restating Powell‘s 
textual argument).  
 206. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 207. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 396–98 (1978) (Marshall, J., 
concurring) (reviewing the history of the Fourteenth Amendment). Just over half of the decisions 
include arguments in the historical modality. See supra note 191 (describing coding process). 
 208. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 772 n.18 (2007) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that race-based measures in Reconstruction were consistent with his 
view of the Constitution insofar as they were enacted ―to remedy state-enforced slavery‖). 
 209. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 947, 957 (1995) (―The legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment contains surprisingly 
little discussion of the meaning of the substantive provisions of Section One, with respect to 
segregation or anything else.‖). In fact, the only thing that is clear from the legislative history of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is that no one (framers and ratifiers) intended it to grant African-Americans 
political rights. Id. at 1024 (explaining that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to confer on 
former slaves ―such civil rights as the right to contract, own property, and sue, but not political rights 
such as the right to vote, hold office, or serve on a jury‖). 
 210. See Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory, supra note 131, at 1921 
(―Unfortunately for an originalist approach to the Fourteenth Amendment, one authoritative source of 
original understanding—the ratifying state legislatures—is also a source concerning which little 
information is available, because of the general absence of extensive recorded debates.‖). 
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from legislative actions taken by the Republican-dominated Congress 
during Reconstruction and likely supports such programs.
211
  
As an aside, the close analysis of these cases reveals a broader scope to 
the historical modality than Bobbitt describes. In several opinions, written 
by a range of Justices, it was the history of race relations, from 
Reconstruction to Jim Crow to Brown that was invoked to settle 
constitutional meaning. For example, in Bakke, Justice Marshall explored 
at great length the history of racial oppression, emphasizing the Court‘s 
complicity in that history both before and after the Civil War, as part of his 
constitutional interpretation.
212
 Perhaps more surprisingly, in Parents 
Involved, Justice Thomas justified his colorblind interpretation of the 
Constitution, in part, by reference to the NAACP‘s aspirations in Brown: 
Most of the dissent‘s criticism of today‘s result can be traced to its 
rejection of the color-blind Constitution. . . . But I am quite 
comfortable in the company I keep. My view of the Constitution is 
Justice Harlan‘s view in Plessy . . . . And my view was the rallying 
cry for the lawyers who litigated Brown.
213
 
While these were not classic instances of the historical modality, they were 
all arguments where history was invoked to settle ambiguity.  
In less than a handful of cases were structural considerations even 
raised. The only case with an extensive structural argument was Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (1995), which involved a challenge to a federal 
statute and thus the question of whether Congress, a co-equal branch of 
 
 
 211. Compare Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 430–31 (1997) (noting that 
the Thirty-Ninth Congress, the same Congress that passed the Fourteenth Amendment and sent it to 
the states for ratification, passed several race-conscious statutes, including one appropriating money 
for ―the relief of destitute colored women and children‖) (emphasis in original) (citing Act of July 28, 
1866, ch. 296, 14 Stat. 310 at 317), and Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753, 759 (1985) (using, inter alia, the legislative history 
of the passage of the Freedmen‘s Bureau, as evidence that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
countenanced the constitutionality of race-conscious affirmative action programs), with Paul Moreno, 
Racial Classifications and the Reconstruction Legislation, 61 J. S. HIST. 271, 273 (1995) (arguing that 
―the evolution of Reconstruction policy, from the Freedmen‘s Bureau to the Fourteenth Amendment, 
was guided by a central principle—to prohibit discrimination based on color‖ and that this is evident in 
the race-neutral language in which remedial statutes were passed). 
 212. 438 U.S. 265, 387–94 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring in part); see also id. at 291–92 
(Powell, J.,) (recounting the history of how ―[t]he Equal Protection Clause . . . was ‗virtually strangled 
in infancy by post-civil-war judicial reactionism‘‖); id. at 326 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (recounting how long it took for the nation to establish ―the principle that ‗all Men 
are created equal‘‖). 
 213. 551 U.S. at 772 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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government, deserved special deference in light of the explicit remedial 
powers granted to it by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
214
 
Ultimately, the competing interpretations on the Court derive from 
differing assessments of the consequences of one interpretation over 
another (arguments in the prudential mode).
215
 In offering these 
assessments, the Justices frequently suggest that the Constitution must be 
interpreted in line with the nation‘s fundamental ethical commitments 
(arguments in the ethical mode).
216
 It is the prudential and ethical 
modalities that, in the last instance, determine the (contending and 
multiple) interpretive conclusions reached. 
While all the Justices aspire to a nation ―in which race no longer 
matters,‖217 they differ in their assessments of the best means to that 
end.
218
 Some Justices are wary of race consciousness because they believe 
that a range of negative consequences will result if the government is 
allowed to distinguish between its citizens based on race.
219
 These Justices 
frequently rehearse the concerns originally identified by Justice Brennan 
 
 
 214. Compare Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 228, 230 (1995) (O‘Connor, J.) 
(―[R]equiring that Congress, like the States, enact racial classifications only when doing so is 
necessary to further a ‗compelling interest‘ does not contravene any principle of appropriate respect 
for a coequal branch of the Government.‖), with id. at 252 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
States and Congress are not similar with respect to equal protection both because ―Congress, unlike 
any State or political subdivision, has a specific constitutional mandate to enforce the dictates of the 
Fourteenth Amendment‖ and because it represents the entire nation) (quoting City of Richmond v. J. 
A. Croson 488 U.S. 469, 490 (1989) (O‘Connor, J.)). 
 215. Extensive prudential arguments appear in about 89% of these cases, appearing in multiple 
opinions. See supra note 191 (describing coding process). 
 216. Ethical commitments are invoked in about 78 percent of the cases, appearing in multiple 
opinions. Most often, they are invoked in a few sentences in combination with a policy argument. See 
supra note 191 (describing coding process). 
 217. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993) (O‘Connor, J.); see also Parents Involved 
in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 551 U.S. 701, 787 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (―The 
enduring hope is that race should not matter; the reality is that too often it does.‖); Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 403 (1978) (Blackmun, J. concurring) (―I yield to no one in my 
earnest hope that the time will come when an ‗affirmative action‘ program is unnecessary and is, in 
truth, only a relic of the past.‖). 
 218. Compare Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748 (Roberts, C.J.) (―The way to stop discrimination 
on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.‖), with id. at 788 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (assenting to Justice Harlan‘s aspiration in theory, but noting that ―[i]n the real world, it is 
regrettable to say, it cannot be a universal constitutional principle‖), with Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306, 344–46 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (endorsing the view that race-conscious programs 
must eventually sunset while ―document[ing] that conscious and unconscious race bias, even rank 
discrimination based on race, remain alive in our land‖ and thus justify the use of affirmative action 
programs for the foreseeable future). 
 219. See, e.g., Shaw, 509 U.S. at 643 (O‘Connor, J.) (―Classifications of citizens solely on the 
basis of race are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the 
doctrine of equality. They threaten to stigmatize individuals by reason of their membership in a racial 
group and to incite racial hostility.‖) (internal quotations and citations omitted).  
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in Carey and Justice Powell in Bakke: that ―the white ‗majority‘ itself is 
composed of various minority groups, most of which can lay claim to a 
history of prior discrimination‖ and that this raises the risk that the 
burdens of affirmative action programs will fall disproportionately on 
these ethnic minorities; that it may not always be clear when race 
consciousness is benign; that ―preferential programs may only reinforce 
common stereotypes‖ including ones of inferiority; and that ―there is a 
measure of inequity in forcing innocent persons . . . to bear the burdens of 
redressing grievances not of their making‖ and this is likely ―to exacerbate 
racial and ethnic antagonisms.‖220 Justice Thomas is currently the most 
vocal about the negative consequences of race-conscious policymaking, 
arguing that it promotes balkanization and resentment.
221
  
These Justices also tend to believe that race-conscious programs 
undermine two central ethical commitments of our nation: individualism 
and the American ―melting pot.‖ As Justice Kennedy expressed: ―To be 
forced to live under a state mandated racial label is inconsistent with the 
dignity of individuals in our society.‖222 Moreover, race-conscious 
policymaking undermines our aspirations for a single American nation: 
―Allowing racial balancing as a compelling end in itself would effectively 
assure that race will always be relevant in American life, and that the 
ultimate goal of eliminating entirely from governmental decisionmaking 
such irrelevant factors as a human being‘s race will never be achieved.‖223 
Other members of the Court are less wary of race-consciousness per 
se.
224
 Following Justice Stevens, they emphasize that not all race-
consciousness is the same:  
 
 
 220. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298–99 (Powell, J., plurality); accord United Jewish Orgs. of 
Williamsburg v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 172 n.2 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part); see also 
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 746 (Roberts, C.J.). Justice Roberts stated: 
Government action dividing us by race is inherently suspect because such classifications 
promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility, reinforce the 
belief, held by too many for too much of our history, that individuals should be judged by the 
color of their skin, and endorse race-based reasoning and the conception of a Nation divided 
into racial blocs, thus contributing to an escalation of racial hostility and conflict. 
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). See also Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657 (O‘Connor, J.) (arguing 
that race-conscious districting is particularly suspect because it ―balkanize[s] us into competing racial 
factions‖). 
 221. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 759 (Thomas, J., concurring) (cautioning that such policies 
―pit[] the races against one another, exacerbat[ing] racial tension, and provok[ing] resentment among 
those who believe that they have been wronged by the government‘s use of race‖) (internal quotations, 
citations, and alterations omitted). 
 222. Id. at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 223. Id. 551 U.S. at 730 (internal quotations, citations, and alterations omitted). 
 224. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 305 n.11 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (―In my 
view, the Constitution, properly interpreted, permits government officials to respond openly to the 
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The consistency that the Court espouses . . . disregard[s] the 
difference between a ―No Trespassing‖ sign and a welcome mat. It 
. . . treat[s] a Dixiecrat Senator‘s decision to vote against Thurgood 
Marshall‘s confirmation in order to keep African-Americans off the 
Supreme Court as on a par with President Johnson‘s evaluation of 
his nominee‘s race as a positive factor. . . . An interest in 
―consistency‖ does not justify treating differences as though they 
were similarities.
225
 
With respect to democracy, in particular, they emphasize that ―[a] 
majority‘s attempt to enable the minority to participate more effectively in 
the process of democratic government should not be viewed with the same 
hostility that is appropriate for oppressive and exclusionary abuses of 
political power.‖226 
These Justices tend to emphasize classic prudential concerns such as 
measurable continued inequality and the retrogressive effects on our 
democracy of treating all forms of race-consciousness similarly.
227
 They 
acknowledge that in contemporary society race, like ethnicity, is 
frequently a good proxy for political viewpoints and worry about the costs 
of interpreting the Constitution to ignore this fact: 
If Chinese-Americans and Russian-Americans may seek and secure 
group recognition in the delineation of voting districts, then 
African-Americans should not be dissimilarly treated. Otherwise, in 
the name of equal protection, we would shut out the very minority 
 
 
continuing importance of race.‖). 
 225. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 245 (1995). 
 226. Shaw II, 517 U.S. 899, 918 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 227. For example, when Justice White explained his objections to the newly established cause of 
action in Shaw, he complained that it ―[would] unnecessarily hinder . . . a State‘s voluntary effort to 
ensure a modicum of minority representation.‖ Shaw, 509 U.S. at 673 (White, J., dissenting). More 
significantly, he emphasized salient facts about redistricting (e.g., that minority populations are 
sometimes geographically dispersed and that political parties like to protect their incumbents) 
explaining how they were likely to contribute to this effect. See id. Accord Gratz, 539 U.S. at 298–300 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg stated:  
This insistence on ‗consistency‘ would be fitting were our Nation free of the vestiges of rank 
discrimination long reinforced by law . . . . In the wake ‗of a system of racial caste only 
recently ended,‘ large disparities endure. Unemployment, poverty, and access to healthcare 
vary disproportionately by race. Neighborhoods and schools remain racially divided. . . . 
Adult African-Americans and Hispanics generally earn less than whites with equivalent levels 
of education.  
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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group whose history in the United States gave birth to the Equal 
Protection Clause.
228
 
These Justices also emphasize a different set of ethical commitments. 
They believe that there is a national commitment to integration post-
Brown.
229
 This commitment, moreover, entails a commitment to a 
modicum of substantive equality: 
Finally, what of the hope and promise of Brown? . . . It was the 
promise of true racial equality—not as a matter of fine words on 
paper, but as a matter of everyday life in the Nation‘s cities and 
schools. It was about the nature of a democracy that must work for 
all Americans.
230
 
Further, these Justices believe that the ideals of integration and pluralist 
democracy require tolerance in the public sphere, and that it is appropriate 
for the state to create educational settings that foster racial tolerance.
231
  
With all this in mind, the answer to the first question—whether the 
Court‘s doctrine is potentially open to challenge because its claim to 
expertise is at its lowest ebb—is surely ―Yes.‖ The close examination of 
these fractured decisions shows that the Court‘s views come down to 
arguments about the consequences of affirmative action (prudential) and 
its relationship to the fundamental norms of our constitutional tradition 
(ethical).  
Not only have these modalities of constitutional interpretation divided 
the Court, creating continued uncertainty about the import of the Equal 
Protection Clause, but they are also precisely the ones for which the Court 
has no claim to unique expertise. This is strikingly evident in the 
redistricting context since the crux of the ethical concern of the Shaw 
majority was that race-conscious legislative districting might be 
 
 
 228. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 947 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal quotations 
and citations omitted). 
 229. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 551 U.S. 701, 803–04 
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting an aspiration for integrated education). 
 230. Id. at 867 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 231. Id. at 864 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (―[T]he fate of race relations in this country depends upon 
unity among our children, for unless our children begin to learn together, there is little hope that our 
people will ever learn to live together.‖) (internal quotations and citations omitted); Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (O‘Connor, J.) (noting with approval that ―the Law School‘s 
admissions policy promotes ‗cross-racial understanding,‘ helps to break down racial stereotypes, and 
‗enables [students] to better understand persons of different races.‘‖); accord Miller, 515 U.S. at 932 
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 247–48 n.5 (1995) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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unconstitutional because of its expressive import.
232
 The social meaning of 
any action is always debatable. As such, expressive harms would seem to 
be exactly the kinds of constitutional questions that are particularly 
appropriate to share with democratically accountable interpreters.
233
 The 
democratic public is in a better position to determine ―whether the 
message conveyed is a distressing endorsement of racial separatism, or an 
inspiring call to integrate the political process.‖234 At the very least, this is 
an arena where the argument that constitutional law is too complicated for 
non-lawyers is weakest.  
This leaves us with the second question: whether, all things considered, 
the question of constitutional limits with respect to race and democratic 
representation should be opened to shared interpretive authority. There are 
good reasons to believe the answer, again, is ―Yes.‖  
For over thirty years, the Court has been unable to settle, let alone 
reach consensus, on the question of whether and how much the 
Constitution constrains affirmative action. The Justices cannot agree, even 
in the majority. The divisions on the Court have forced government 
officials to develop programs in the shadow of uncertainty, and litigators 
to strategize about how to swing the fifth vote—once Justice O‘Connor, 
now Justice Kennedy. As such, there is no settlement to undermine by 
revoking the default rule of judicial supremacy. 
The second strongest argument in favor of judicial supremacy—that 
the Court is the only institution capable of protecting individual rights 
against majoritarian institutions—is also not implicated. In the context of 
race and redistricting, no one is denied the right to vote.
235
 In fact, ―the 
mere placement of an individual in one district instead of another denies 
no one a right or benefit provided to others.‖236  
 
 
 232. Cf. Shaw II, 517 U.S. 899, 922 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the alleged harm 
was the ―message [conveyed] to voters across the State‖); accord Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. 
Niemi, Expressive Harms: “Bizarre Districts,‖ and Voting Rights, Evaluating Election-District 
Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483 (1993) (arguing that the harm being 
recognized in the doctrine is not an individualized material harm but rather a political expressive 
harm). 
 233. Cf. Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 925 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for engaging in 
―speculative judicial suppositions about the societal message that is to be gleaned from race-based 
districting‖).  
 234. Id. at 925 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 235. Id. at 921 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting counsel‘s concession that plaintiffs had not been 
prohibited from voting). 
 236. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 681–82 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting); accord id. at 663–64 
(White, J., dissenting) (noting that unlike in the employment and educational context, ―the 
classification based on race‖ does not ―discriminate[] against anyone by denying equal access to the 
political process‖). 
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If anything, the presence of the fundamental right to vote is a 
distraction. Redistricting is a context in which the entire orientation toward 
individualism and rights is arguably incoherent. No one is ever treated as 
an individual in the redistricting process.
237
 It is invariably a process in 
which demographic variables are used as proxies for political preference. 
Our constitutional commitment to federalism, meanwhile, weighs 
heavily in favor of revoking the default rule. Federalism properly 
understood is a system that seeks ―to preserve the regulatory authority of 
state and local institutions to legislate policy choices‖ distinct from the 
regulatory authority of the national government.
238
 The value of states is 
that they provide a diversity of political options to the nation‘s citizens.239  
The ability of the people of the several States to structure their 
representative institutions, therefore, is at the heart of the system of 
federalism. Any nationalization of the options available to states in 
creating their representative institutions undermines federalism.  
Judicial efforts to restructure state governments ―necessarily press the 
boundaries of federal-court jurisdiction, if they do not surpass it.‖240 The 
Court has long recognized this point: ―[F]ederalism and the slim judicial 
competence to draw district lines weigh heavily against judicial 
intervention in apportionment decisions.‖241 Where the constitutional 
constraint is clear or settled, this is just what our constitutional democracy 
requires.
242
 Absent constitutional constraint, however, our Constitution 
favors experimentation. As such: 
 
 
 237. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 947 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg 
stated:  
In adopting districting plans, however, States do not treat people as individuals. 
Apportionment schemes, by their very nature, assemble people in groups. States do not assign 
voters to districts based on merit or achievement . . . . Rather, legislators classify voters in 
groups—by economic, geographical, political or social characteristics . . . . 
Id. Accord Shaw, 509 U.S. at 646 (1993) (O‘Connor, J.) ―[R]edistricting differs from other kinds of 
state decisionmaking in that the legislature always is aware of race when it draws district lines, just as 
it is aware of age, economic status, religious and political persuasion, and a variety of other 
demographic factors.‖).  
 238. Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 215, 222 (2000). 
 239. See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders‟ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1484, 1493, 1498–1500 (1987) (offering an updated normative defense of our system of dual 
sovereignty that emphasizes, among other things, the value of laboratories of democracy). 
 240. Shaw II, 517 U.S. 899, 922 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 241. Miller, 515 U.S. at 934–35 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 
586 (1964)). 
 242. Cf. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1047 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that states‘ 
constitutionally protected interest in controlling their citizens‘ representation in Congress can be 
limited when there is ―a strong constitutional justification and a reasonably definite standard for doing 
so‖). 
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When a federal court is called upon . . . to parse among varying 
legislative choices about the political structure of a State, and when 
the litigant‘s claim ultimately rests on ―a difference of opinion as to 
the function of representative government‖ rather than a claim of 
discriminatory exclusion, there is reason for pause.
243
 
In conclusion, all things considered, there are legitimate reasons to take 
the question, whether and to what degree the Constitution constrains 
policies that seek to account for the continued salience of race in the 
construction of representative institutions, out of the Court‘s exclusive 
domain. There is no particular reason to believe the Court is uniquely 
positioned to consider this question. It has failed to resolve the issue over 
the past thirty years. As such, it would be reasonable for the public to 
revoke its consent to judicial supremacy and for our elected officials to 
reassert their interpretive authority under the Constitution.  
Finally, a word about who should share interpretive authority. 
Although the question of whether states and their officials ought to be able 
to share in constitutional interpretation has been a fraught one, it would 
seem that if there is any context where it would be appropriate, it would be 
here. If, as Herbert Wechsler pointed out, the rights of states are preserved 
by their control over the House of Representatives through their ―control 
of voters‘ qualifications, on the one hand, and districting, on the other,‖244 
then states surely have an even greater interest in this controversy, and 
they probably should be given a voice in the matter. On the other hand, 
Congress and the Executive could conceivably protect states‘ interests, 
and perhaps it would be wise to push this question off once more. 
Who knows how a broader constitutional discussion might turn out. It 
might be that one of the views expressed on the Court is adopted. The 
debate outside the judiciary (like the debate within) might focus on the 
potential costs and benefits of majority-minority districting as a policy 
matter assessed in light of our ethical commitments as a nation. On the 
other hand, the discussion might take an entirely different turn. The public 
 
 
 243. Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 923 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 333 
(1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
 244. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the 
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 548 (1954). It is 
worth noting that Kramer agrees with Wechsler that these two structural features of the Constitution tie 
the House of Representatives to states as States. See Kramer, supra note 238, at 226 (noting that ―[t]he 
only political safeguards Wechsler identifies that do not suffer from this conflating of state interests 
and state institutions are those he attaches to the House of Representatives‖). Kramer‘s concern is that 
these controls—particularly the former—are no longer present as a practical matter, partly thanks to 
the Supreme Court. Id. at 224–27. 
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and the elected branches of government, free from the institutional 
constraints of the judicial forum, might be convinced that the Guarantee 
Clause, with its emphasis on the nature of political institutions and the 
people‘s collective right to self-governance, rather than the Equal 
Protection Clause, is the appropriate constitutional frame for analyzing 
this problem.
245
 
While the broader constitutional discussion was occurring, courts could 
still be petitioned for review. The Executive, however, might conduct 
elections, pursuant to districts it considered constitutional, notwithstanding 
pending litigation.
246
 It might even refuse to abide by preliminary 
injunctions. Meanwhile, Congress might seat members elected pursuant to 
allegedly unconstitutional districting schemes,
247
 or it might invoke its 
constitutional authority over the time, place and manner of elections to 
establish congressional districts, preempting state redistricting efforts.
248
  
Whatever the co-equal branches did, they would first have to reassert 
formally their independent constitutional entitlement to interpret the 
Constitution on this question and explain to the public why shared 
interpretive authority was appropriate. The public, meanwhile, would have 
to listen and judge, informed by a variety of knowledgeable (and less 
knowledgeable) participants in the public sphere. 
V. WHY BOTH ARE BETTER THAN EITHER 
Critics of popular constitutionalism have articulated myriad reasonable 
concerns about shared interpretive authority. A few words about how the 
framework developed here is likely to withstand similar criticisms is, 
therefore, appropriate. 
The framework offered here preserves many of the advantages of 
judicial supremacy at the same time that it shores up both our institutional 
 
 
 245. Cf. Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current 
Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 103, 106, 116 (2000) (arguing that while ―a government 
is not ‗republican‘ if a minority faction maintains control, and the majority has no means of 
overturning it,‖ there is no similar constitutional worry where the majority opts to give a minority 
proportional representation). 
 246. Cf. Paulsen, supra note 45, at 277 (―To the extent judgments require execution, the executive, 
not the judiciary, has the last interpretive word.‖). 
 247. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5 (―Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and 
Qualifications of its own Members.‖). 
 248. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (―The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and 
Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at 
any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.‖). 
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checks on the Court and the public‘s engagement with the Constitution.249 
As such, it goes a long way toward addressing the concerns of those who 
are generally skeptical about shared interpretive authority. Furthermore, 
the arguments offered here actually justify our widespread confidence that 
the Court is better at constitutional interpretation, even as they point to 
limits to it expertise. 
The framework is not a wholesale rejection of judicial review. The 
Court will always get the first shot. In fact, those who are disgruntled with 
the Court must wait out a series of cases before resisting. The Court‘s 
legitimacy, as an institution that should be obeyed, is not up for wholesale 
reconsideration. 
The form of shared interpretive authority advocated here, moreover, is 
not even a wholesale rejection of judicial supremacy. By setting up a 
revocable default rule of supremacy, it preserves for the Court a final say 
with respect to a great number of constitutional questions. The default rule 
is only revocable in cases where the Court‘s claim to expertise is at its 
lowest ebb and it is failing to bring closure to constitutional ambiguity. 
Even then, it may not be appropriate. Where the Court does in fact 
exercise its unique interpretive expertise or otherwise settle constitutional 
ambiguity, its views will be final. As such, any rejection of judicial 
supremacy would be issue limited, and the Court would never be deprived 
wholesale of finality. By delineating and limiting the appropriate bases for 
challenging judicial supremacy, the framework has taken off the table 
challenges whose only justification is a political disagreement with the 
outcome. 
The Court, moreover, retains a say even if the default rule is revoked. 
This offsets any second-order decisional costs for the Court: The 
framework does not require the Court to decide whether it can decide in 
the first place. It can always consider constitutional issues properly before 
it. The only thing that changes is that sometimes its view may be 
considered advisory, so to speak. 
In these various ways, the framework developed seeks to limit the 
settlement costs associated with shared interpretive authority and to 
conserve many of the substantive benefits of a judicially interpreted 
Constitution. That said, whenever one allows for shared interpretive 
authority, there will be more uncertainty compared to the bright-line 
 
 
 249. Cf. KRAMER, supra note 2, at 111 (indicating aim of popular constitutionalism is to enhance 
―the people‘s active control of their government and their Constitution‖). 
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alternatives—giving the Constitution entirely to the Court or taking it 
entirely from it.  
Any rejection of wholesale judicial supremacy will require us to accept 
a constitutionalism ―willing to tolerate ongoing controversy over 
competing plausible interpretations of the constitution.‖250 There is no 
point in denying that there will be less coherence or that any turn to the 
political process these days risks paralysis. Still, there is space for 
optimism.  
Shared interpretive authority, while theoretically unstable, has as a 
historical matter resulted in a great deal of stability.
251
 For much of our 
history, judicial supremacy was contested. As such, our constitutional 
history is replete with examples of ―constitutional disagreement among 
different groups of officials.‖252 Yet, these conflicts rarely dissolved into 
civil war or significant unrest.
253
  
Elements of shared interpretive authority remain part of our system. 
Between the political question doctrine and the Court‘s limited 
enforcement powers, the U.S. Constitution is already a shared project.
254
 
And, we already regularly turn to the political process. It is just that we 
focus on judicial appointments rather than emphasizing interpretive 
discussions in which reasons and explanations must be offered and the 
Court must be engaged on its own terms.  
If we look honestly at the system we have, we must acknowledge that 
we already live with a great deal of constitutional uncertainty. With 
respect to a good number of issues, the Justices divide year in and year 
out. In fact, some might be surprised to learn that between 1977 and 2010, 
only 39 percent of Supreme Court cases involving a constitutional issue 
were decided either unanimously or with only one dissent.
255
  
 
 
 250. Id. at 30. 
 251. Cf. Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and 
Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773, 789 (2002); KRAMER, supra note 2, at 234 (noting that as an 
empirical matter ―[u]ncertainty and instability will exist even in a regime of total judicial supremacy, 
while we will find a considerable degree of finality and resolution even without it‖). 
 252. Matthew D. Adler, Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition: Whose Practices 
Ground U.S. Law?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 719, 757–58 (2006) (noting that four axes of constitutional 
disagreement emerge in reviewing our history—departmental, partisan, regional, and state-federal). 
 253. Id. at 783 (noting that, among other things, ―the scope of national power,‖ the existence of 
unenumerated rights, judicial supremacy, and an agreed upon method of constitutional interpretation 
have all been disputed since the Civil War). I, therefore, respectfully, but fundamentally, disagree with 
those who argue that absent judicial supremacy, there will be unpredictability, anarchy even. 
 254. Cf. GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (1991). 
 255. That percentage only increases to 42 percent if one lengthens the timeframe to 1946–2010; 
allowing for two dissents, brings the percentages to 54 percent and 58 percent respectively. See 
Spaeth, supra note 128. 
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Increased uncertainty is a price worth paying to shore up public 
engagement with the Constitution and our system of checks and 
balances.
256
 From the perspective of checks and balances, judicial 
supremacy is far from optimal. As many in the founding generation 
understood too well, judicial supremacy creates an unaccountable and all 
too powerful Court.
257
  
Shoring up our institutional checks is particularly important at the 
moment.
258
 The amendment process is defunct.
259
 A range of previously 
relied upon checks have disappeared, and there are increasing reasons to 
worry about the efficacy of the appointments process.
260
 By making clear 
that consent to judicial supremacy can be revoked, the framework offered 
here brings the Court closer to heel.
261
 Congress and the Executive, even 
the public, need to feel entitled to independent views on the Constitution 
in order to serve as a check on the Court. Moreover, if the Court was 
worried that it had to earn its claim to finality, it might be more likely to 
act within its sphere of expertise and to work toward unanimity and, 
therefore, moderation.
262
 All of which would likely enhance the legitimacy 
of the Court and decrease the likelihood that the default rule of judicial 
supremacy would be revoked. 
The framework proposed here also serves fundamental deliberative 
values. The disgruntled must engage with the Court on its own terms. 
Further, if the default rule is revoked, non-Article III actors are required to 
 
 
 256. For a thoughtful explanation of why these checks may need to be shored up see Pildes, supra 
note 18. Richard Pildes explains how a host of changes, from divided government to the acceptance of 
judicial supremacy, to the increasingly paralyzed political process, have created ―greater . . . space for 
Supreme Court independence‖ and exacerbated the countermajoritarian difficulty. Id. at 157. 
 257. See Jefferson, supra note 19, at 311; accord Meigs, supra note 31, at 190 (cautioning that if 
Hamilton‘s position that the Court is the institution whose ―‗peculiar function‘‖ is ―to decide finally 
and conclusively upon the question of the meaning of our constitution‖ is adopted, then ―there is no 
limit to [the Court‘s] power‖). 
 258. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 2, at 231 (―[A] people that accedes to the Court‘s pretentions 
in this respect will permit the Justices to go farther and do more than a people that does not.‖). 
 259. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 167 (2006) (arguing 
that ―[t]he functional impossibility of amending the Constitution with regard to anything truly 
significant‖ fundamentally undermines our constitutional tradition); accord Adam M. Samaha, Dead 
Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 606, 609 (2008); David A. 
Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457 (2001). 
 260. See, e.g., Pildes, supra note 18, at 136–42, 151–59. 
 261. Cf. KRAMER, supra note 2, at 253 (―Indeed, a great irony of making clear that we can and 
should punish an overreaching Court is that it will then almost never be necessary to do so.‖). 
 262. See Waldron, supra note 48, at 1391–92 (implicitly criticizing judicial decisions that lack 
unanimity by noting that while a normative defense of a majority decisional rule can be made for 
legislatures, majority voting in judicial decisionmaking lacks ―any moral basis‖); Paulsen, supra note 
45, at 325–29 (using game theory to explain why ―shared interpretive power‖ often leads to 
―compromise, accommodation, or partial resolution‖). 
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engage in ―[i]nterpreting a written constitution,‖ defined as the act of 
―resolv[ing] ambiguities in constitutional meaning‖—a separate endeavor 
from ―changing a constitution.‖263  
Judicial supremacy, by contrast, has a tendency to discourage 
constitutional interpretation outside the Court. It undermines the incentives 
of legislators and executive officials to take their constitutional oaths 
seriously.
264
 Over a hundred years ago, Thayer observed that overzealous 
judicial review ―has had a tendency to drive out questions of justice and 
right, and to fill the mind of legislators with thoughts of mere legality, of 
what the constitution allows,‖ with the result that ―they have felt little 
responsibility‖ to consider constitutional questions, knowing they can pass 
the buck to the Court.
265
 More recently, Tushnet has made this same point, 
explaining how ―the judicial overhang can deflect legislators from 
considering constitutional questions.‖266 He complains that the result is 
irresponsibility.
267
 Judicial supremacy may also undermine the public‘s 
engagement with the Constitution.
268
  
The widespread acceptance of judicial supremacy and the increased 
politicization of the appointments process have also created undesirable 
pressures on the Court itself.
269
 When the Court is the only forum to 
resolve high-stakes constitutional fights, the incentives to politicize the 
Court are magnified. By reopening avenues for constitutional argument 
outside the Court and rejecting a per se rule of supremacy, the proposed 
 
 
 263. Alexander & Solum, supra note 7, at 1602–03. A deliberative constraint on popular 
constitutional interpretation is of longstanding pedigree. KRAMER, supra note 2, at 25 (explaining that 
in the late eighteenth century, when denouncing unconstitutional acts, the public was expected to 
explain why it thought the government‘s actions were unconstitutional) (citing PAULINE MAIER, FROM 
RESISTANCE TO REVOLUTION: COLONIAL RADICALS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN 
OPPOSITION TO BRITAIN, 1765–76, 74–75, 114–38, 251–53 (1992)). 
 264. See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 66 (suggesting that the degree to which actors in 
Congress do not consider the Constitution a high priority may be a product of the Court‘s dominance 
over constitutional questions). 
 265. Thayer, supra note 28, at 155–56. 
 266. TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 58. 
 267. Id. at 59–61 (arguing that an excessive focus on Court doctrine, in particular, the level of 
judicial review, leads too frequently to laws that are superficially in compliance but easily struck down 
as unconstitutional and unreasoned). 
 268. KRAMER, supra note 2, at passim. 
 269. The politicization of the appointments process followed shortly after the acceptance of 
judicial supremacy. See Griffin, supra note 1, at 123–29. By politicization I mean both partisan politics 
and a comfort with policymaking on both sides of the partisan line. Judicial supremacy is obviously 
not the only institutional feature that encourages politicization. See id. at 116 (pointing to the Court‘s 
near total control over its docket, which coincided with the expansion of its jurisdiction as another 
institutional factor). 
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regime lowers the political stakes in the judicial forum. The appointments 
process, in particular, should become less important.  
Judicial supremacy, in sum, undermines constitutional argument in all 
relevant forums. Justice Jackson once proclaimed: ―The vice of judicial 
supremacy, as exerted for ninety years in the field of policy, has been its 
progressive closing of the avenues to peaceful and democratic conciliation 
of our social and economic conflicts.‖270 This vice extends to closing off 
avenues for civil deliberation about our profound constitutional 
conflicts.
271
 Furthermore, the judicially enforced Constitution is 
constrained by institutional limitations.
272
 
A final point must be addressed. Praise of judicial supremacy is often 
entwined with deep skepticism about democracy and about the ability of 
legislatures or executives to engage in principled constitutional 
decisionmaking. Such concerns are only exacerbated when it comes to the 
public (even after putting the mob to one side). 
With respect to the Executive, the skeptic‘s views are hardly credible 
for the simple reason that ―[t]he executive branch has several important 
institutions devoted to constitutional interpretation, most notably the 
Solicitor General‘s office and the Office of Legal Counsel in the 
Department of Justice.‖273 Of particular significance is the work of the 
Office of Legal Counsel, whose constitutional interpretations are not 
written for the Supreme Court.  
An emerging literature shows Congress too is capable of constitutional 
deliberation.
274
 It is certainly clear that legislatures are not per se incapable 
 
 
 270. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: A STUDY OF A CRISIS IN 
AMERICAN POWER POLITICS 321 (1941) (as quoted in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 491 
(1980) (Burger, C.J.)). 
 271. See, e.g., West, supra note 13, at 76. West states:  
Surely . . . not only lawmakers but citizens . . . should worry over whether our moral and 
social inclinations to outlaw contraception, regulate abortion, criminalize flag burning, allow 
prayer in schools . . . are or are not consistent with the commitments to liberty, equality, and a 
secular state that lawyers and courts find reflected in constitutional phrases. 
Id. 
 272. Cf. id. at 65–66, 73–74 (discussing historical movements for basic welfare rights and the 
limits of achieving such rights when the Constitution is expounded only by judges and lawyers in 
ordinary courts of law); accord TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 169–72 (arguing that ―[f]reed of concerns 
about judicial review, we might also be able to develop a more robust understanding of constitutional 
social welfare rights‖ because the primary barrier to accepting such rights are institutional limitations 
of judicial enforcement). 
 273. TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 61–62 (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 905, 916–17 (1990)). 
 274. See, e.g., THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL STATE PT. V (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006) (in which several 
authors consider constitutional interpretation in the legislative branch).  
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of deliberating about rights in the ways that would be required.
275
  
Two other facts are relevant in this regard. First, as previously 
mentioned, a great many important constitutional questions cannot be 
adjudicated, and are already regularly entrusted to these to co-equal 
branches of government. Second, the Court‘s own constitutional 
interpretations frequently come from outside the Court—from the briefs of 
the Solicitor General and other litigants, including public interest 
organizations such as the ACLU, Judicial Watch, and NRDC.
276
  
How skeptical one is likely to be about the public‘s capacity to engage 
in constitutional interpretation largely depends on the image of the public 
onto which one latches. The public sphere in the United States is certainly 
an imperfect forum for serious constitutional argumentation and 
interpretation, but it is a gross overstatement to suggest that there are no 
spaces for constitutional argument, or that the public is entirely incapable 
of serious constitutional interpretation. Forums for reasoned argument 
exist throughout the public sphere even in our large pluralist democracy. 
We have, for example, foundations and think tanks as well as public 
interest groups and excellent new and old media. 
It is also a grave mistake to idealize the deliberative nature of the 
Court. If there is reason to be concerned that non-Article III actors, most 
especially the public, will simply latch onto whatever argument gets them 
to the political outcome they want, this is no less a concern for the 
Justices.
277
 
There is one concern about shared interpretive authority that no 
framework that weakens judicial supremacy can truly address. This is the 
fear that without judicial supremacy, the mob will rule.
278
 It drives the 
―deep ambivalence‖ among ―serious liberal thinkers in America . . . 
toward popular constitutionalism.‖279  
 
 
 275. See Waldron, supra note 48, at 1349–50 (offering as example British parliamentary debate on 
abortion as evidence that legislatures are able to discuss questions of rights, including competing 
rights, in a sophisticated way). 
 276. Alexander & Solum overstate the case when they suggest that the people could only engage 
in ―[r]obust interpretive popular constitutionalism‖ if the United States were either ―a small city-state‖ 
or a society with ―overwhelming social consensus on constitutional issues.‖ Alexander & Solum, 
supra note 7, at 1623 n.72.  
 277. Cf. BOBBITT, supra note 10, at 22 (addressing the charge that judges act instrumentally, 
deploying whichever rhetorical device suits their political ideologies). 
 278. See, e.g., Alexander & Solum, supra note 7, at 1594 (confessing that any revival of a populist 
tradition of constitutional interpretation would ―inspire dread and make the blood run cold‖); accord 
Powe, Jr., supra note 7, at 866–84 (offering a parade of seven populist horrors, frequently marked by 
violence or the threat of violence).  
 279. See Forbath, supra note 20, at 971–72 (explaining that ―the appeal of judicial supremacy‖ for 
liberals cannot be understood apart from the struggle for a racially inclusive democracy before and 
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The reason that this concern cannot be addressed is that, at bottom, this 
fear of the mob is a profound normative divide between advocates of 
judicial supremacy and advocates of shared interpretive authority. Which 
side of that line one finds oneself on depends a great deal on how much 
one trusts democracy and the public (voting and nonvoting).  
Personally, I am cautiously optimistic. Given the world in which we 
live—a highly stable society with virtually no political violence, with far 
too many campaign ads and pollsters, and with too few citizens engaged in 
politics, constitutional or otherwise—it is hard to imagine that more 
democracy and more deliberation could hurt. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that what has been missing in the debate so far 
over judicial supremacy is an account of the practice of constitutional 
interpretation. This absence is particularly glaring insofar as the normative 
case for judicial supremacy importantly depends on the Court‘s relative 
interpretive expertise.  
A closer look at the practice of constitutional interpretation reveals that 
the Supreme Court‘s claim to expertise has limits. Where constitutional 
meaning is largely determined on the basis of prudential or ethical 
arguments, other branches of government are at least as capable of 
interpretation. Put differently, certain lessons of Chevron apply to 
constitutional interpretation as well.
280
  
The remainder of this Article sought to develop an account of how 
these insights about the Court‘s interpretive expertise could be developed 
into a framework for transferring certain issues out of the Court‘s 
exclusive domain. When might it be reasonable for the public to decide 
that the Court should not have the final say with respect to a particular 
interpretive question? When might it be reasonable for the co-equal 
branches of government to reassert their interpretive prerogatives under 
the Constitution? To illustrate how the analysis could work, the framework 
was applied to the Court‘s doctrine on affirmative action to consider 
whether its views with respect to the constitutionality of accounting for the 
continued salience of race in creating democratic institutions should be 
final.  
 
 
after the Civil War); TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 177 (arguing that ―[l]iberals today seem to have a 
deep-rooted fear of voting‖ that explains their enthusiasm for judicial review). 
 280. See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss6/3
  
 
 
 
 
2012] LINKING THE QUESTIONS 1373 
 
 
 
 
Many, particularly liberals and progressives, might wonder how this 
framework is likely to play out in other areas of the law—the death 
penalty, abortion, privacy, and so on. Would the Court ever get the final 
say?  
Without having gone through a thorough analysis of these other areas, 
one cannot say for sure. I suspect, however, that a good number of 
politically charged, constitutional issues would not be up for grabs. For 
example, a close analysis of the Court‘s cases on state sovereign immunity 
is likely to reveal profound divisions over original intent (history) and 
structural imperatives. The Court‘s Commerce Clause doctrine is a closer 
call. There are also doctrinal lines replete with five to four decisions that 
are likely to remain in the Court‘s domain because they are best 
understood as instances where there is broad agreement as to the import of 
the Constitution, but the Justices struggle to reach consensus because they 
have set out an incoherent or unworkable doctrine and thus frequently 
come to divergent views on the facts. The public forum doctrine comes to 
mind.  
All that said, my primary answer is that the relevant consequentialist 
concern should not turn on how much may or may not turn out to be 
eligible for the transfer. Instead, the relevant cost-benefit analysis should 
focus on the institutional and structural consequences for our democracy 
and its foundational aspiration for republican deliberative policymaking 
(including constitutional policymaking) of the status quo as compared to 
what has been proposed here. That is, we should be focused on the effects 
of different interpretive regimes on our system of checks and balances and 
our aspiration to principled constitutionalism.  
Finally, there are those who will rightly point out that it is unlikely that 
such a mechanism will ever be developed. Sadly, this is right. 
Nevertheless, I believe there are benefits in staking out the position and 
arguing it as persuasively as possible (including showing how it could 
work within existing government structures).  
Change is incremental. To the degree the arguments presented here 
have disrupted even momentarily or modestly a reader‘s faith in judicial 
supremacy, our discourse will have shifted slightly. If the argument makes 
it into the chambers of judges, perhaps through their law clerks, we may 
hope for more modesty from the courts when they engage in constitutional 
judgements that turn on modalities for which they have no unique claims 
of expertise. If they make it into the chambers of Congress or the White 
House, we can hope for more boldness. 
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